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CHAPTER I 
Introduction - Public sector labor relations and unionism is a 
political issue engendering two alternative claims regarding the 
outcome of labor reform within the bureaucracy. The predominant 
view portends a kind of industrial democracy which will not only 
result in public employees achieving a disproportionate degree of 
influence in governmental decision-making vis-a-vis their interest 
groups but will obstruct public management from carrying out its 
designated function. Another vision suggest that public unionism 
can be instrumental in reversing the general trend of 
depoliticization occurring in contemporary society by effecting a 
needed democratization of the bureaucracy where major decisions 
regarding society's distribution of goods and resources are 
administratively determined. 
While the explanatory model that emerges from the latter 
perspective has been less than successful in empirically 
documenting its broad claims, proponents espousing some variant of 
the former position have concentrated upon researching the 
development and implementation of public bargaining. 
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Although these tend to acknowledge that sufficient justification 
exists for accomodating public unionisms, their descriptive and 
prescriptive implications suggest a singular outcome occurs with 
the practice of collective bargaining that has deleterious effects 
for governmental operation. Preceding from this premise, the 
resultant institutionalization process is evaluated to determine 
to what extent this proposition is realized. 
Offering a critique of the two previous perspectives, Lewin 
and Horton made the following observation: 
Although substantial changes have occurred in 
public sector labor relations during the past 
decade, the literature dealing with 
unionization and collective bargaining in 
government... remains essentially static in 
terms of issues addressed, conceptualization, 
and methodology. This literature largely is 
preoccupied with normative and processual 
issues; in particular, it lacks empirical 
examination of the impacts of collectively 
bargained decisions on government...The 
intensity of the ideological heat generated by 
the early (and ongoing) arguments between 
'industrial democrats' and 'political' 
democrats over the propriety of public 
section bargaining not only produced an 
atmosphere more conducive to normative 
assertion than empirical investigation, but 
also stimulated a widespread (and again 
ongoing) search for some set of procedures, 
laws, and institutions - in short, a process - 
by which bilateralism could be introduced into 
public sector labor relations. 
David Lewin and Raymond D. Horton, "The Impact of 
Collective Bargaining on the Merit System in Government," pp 
415-416 in Public Sector Labor Relations: Analysis and Readings 
edited by David Lewin, Peter Feuille and Thomas Â'. Koch an (Glen 
Ridge, New Jersey: Thomas Horton and Daughters, 1977). 
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While a disavowel of ideological considerations is intended 
to minimize the polemical nature of the discourse on public 
bargaining, the above viewpoint avoids a fundamental issue raised 
in the discussion of both radical and conservative observers. 
Restated theoretically, this involves the recognition that within 
the structures and processes of any organized entity, a 
mobilization of bias inheres which supports an extant arrangement 
of disparate interests. This entails, at the minimum, a 
consideration of the dominant values, myths, and established 
political or administrative procedures and rules of the game and 
which group within the organization gains from the existing bias. 
To simply decry the effects such arguments have on public 
bargaining research is to acknowledge only the problem. As 
presumed organizational imperatives, the resonant notions embodied 
in the prevailing bias order and structure much of what the 
empiricist unreflectively studies and consequently informs what is 
found and eventually concluded about public bargaining. 
However, the notion of such a bias is analytically 
submerged either because its existence is simply assumed and 
therefore deemed not worth belaboring, or because analytical 
perspectives demand its subordination or elimination in favor of 
alternative concepts. Yet ignoring views regarding the purposes 
and aims of organizational arrangements and the desirability, 
hence the effect, of change severely diminishes the critical edge 
of any explanation that emerges from an investigation of policy 
outcomes. 
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In some respects the 'polemical nature' of the debate more 
clearly conveys the political dimension underscoring the attendant 
institutionalizing of bargaining in that the search "...for some 
2 
set of procedures, laws and institutions..." involves setting 
terms and conditions that will be advantageous to some persons or 
group vis-a-vis others. Thus arguments citing the deleterious 
effects of bargaining, for example, can be seen as an expression 
of a particular mobilization of bias regarding the 
employer-employee relationship in the public sector. 
What is lacking among the work of mainstream analysts and 
unsuccessfully developed by radical writers is a critical 
discussion of the contrapuntal nature of the collective bargaining 
process generally, and the subsequent policy outcome of this 
process, the labor agreement. For example, the constituent 
features comprising mainstream research projects are impact 
studies related to compensation, formal governmental structure, 
service production and delivery, personnel administration, and 
informal politics. 
Compensation studies generally involve explications of the 
causes of the relatively rapid increase in public employee wages 
that has occurred during the past two decades. A major 
2Ibid. 
3 
Examples of such studies include Walter Forgel and David 
Lewin "Wage Determination in the Public Sector," Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 27 (April 1974):410-31; Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
and Gerald S. Goldstein, "A Model of Public Sector Wage 
Determination," Journal of Urban Economics 2 (July 1975): 223-45 ; 
Roger W. Schmenner, "The Determination of Municipal Employee 
Wages, Review of Economics and Statistics," 55 (February 
1973):83-90; and Edward H. Friend, First National Survey of 
Employee Benefits for Full-Time Personnel of U.S. Municipalities 
(Washington, D.C.: Labor Management Relations Service, October 
1972). 
-5- 
assumption of compensation studies is that the rise in public 
wages has exacerbated the fiscal crisis confronting state and 
local governments. With regard to formal governmental structures, 
in order to promote and administer collective bargaining policy, 
governments have had to institute structural and legal changes in 
their institutional make-up. The nature of these changes range 
from having personnel departments charged with the responsibility 
for representing management in collective bargaining to the 
creation of independent or quasi-independent agencies responsible 
for administering labor relations programs has tended to 
centralize previously fragmented managerial decision-making 
systems. Studies of service provisions and delivery and personnel 
administration, on the other hand, focus attention on the impact 
bargaining has upon internal governmental management policy and 
decision-making.^ For example, the former refers to work rules 
and procedures, manning schedules and job assignments while 
personnel administration encompasses the rules by which employees 
are selected, promoted, and disciplined. Following the impact on 
compensation and work stoppages, collective bargaining has 
affected the reallocation of authority by legitimizing challenges 
to management's unilateral authority to organize work. 
^The most cited source in this area is David Stanley and 
Carole L. Cooper, Managing Local Government Under Union Pressure, 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1962). More recent research 
included David Lewin and Robert D. Horton, "Evaluating the impact 
of collective bargaining on personnel administration in 
government," Arbitration Journal 30 (September 1975): 199-211 ; John 
F. Burton, Jr., "Local Government Bargaining and Management 
Structure," Industrial Relations 11 (May 1972:123-140 and David 
Stanley, "What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems," in Collective 
Bargaining in Government: Readings and Cases, edited by Joseph 
Loewenberg and Michael H. Moskow (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1972), pp. 81-90. 
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Purpose of the Study — While some useful findings have been 
generated by these studies, none have included a discussion of the 
basic instrument precipitating the outcomes found during an 
investigation, the contract. As will be demonstrated in the 
literature review which follows, there is irony in this omission 
in that the private sector analogy permeates both the theory and 
practice of public sector bargaining, nevertheless, seldom is 
there a delineation of the possibilities as well as the 
limitations of the agreement as it has been constituted in 
American labor relations, and more importantly how this effects 
the outcomes of labor public policy. 
Thus this study is an attempt to form a link with previous 
research which, while advancing knowledge of the process of 
bargaining, has neglected to incorporate any systematic 
interpretation of the primary mechanism of the labor relations 
process. In order to illustrate a theoretical discussion on labor 
agreements within the context of an institutionalization process, 
the study examines the development of the labor relations policy 
in the City of Dayton, Ohio. Specifically, the study focuses on 
the relationship between the city and an affiliate of the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Dayton 
Public Service Union, Local 101 (DPSU). This unit of analysis was 
selected for several reasons. 
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First, research needs to reflect a broader geographic base 
and levels of experiences as the preponderance of study has been 
directed toward those states and local governments which have 
initiated comprehensive bargaining legislation. This has left 
underdeveloped the experience of units of government which have 
instituted collective bargaining without such legislation. Ohio 
has just recently developed and implemented statewide bargaining 
legislation. Consequently, the development of local public labor 
relations in Ohio has not been guided by any uniform procedures. 
Dayton's policy, therefore, is a reflection of its acceptance of 
the phenomenon of public unionism and the utilization of 
collective bargaining to structure some aspects of its employment 
relationship. 
There is also a need to expand the analysis of occupational 
groups within the public sector. As Lewin notes the 
...majority of public sector research has 
focused on the occupational groups of police, 
fire fighters, and teachers. In our rush to 
study the more militant and/or essential 
services, we have failed adequately to study 
bargaining among... other occupational 
groups. 
DPSU Local 101 represents a majority of the city's 
organized public employees who are classified as general service 
employees. First as the Dayton Public Service Union and most 
recently as an affiliate of AFSCME AFL-CIO, the union has been 
■’"Epilogue: An Agenda for Future Research," p. 464 in 
Public Sector Labor Relations. 
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engaged in both informal and formal bargaining with the city since 
1964. 
With these points in mind, the study will examine the 
city's labor relations policy. Particular attention will be given 
to the formal bargaining outcomes contained in negotiated 
agreements executed between DPSU Local 101 and the City for the 
period 1969-1981. 
In order to assess how the rank and file view the extant 
labor relations policy and practice, an analysis will be made of 
the attitudes and opinions of the general service employees 
represented by DPSU Local 101. 
Source of Data — The diversity of primary sources of data 
utilized in the study included: 
a. Negotiated agreements between the City of Dayton, Ohio 
and DPSU Local 101 from 1969-1981 
b. City of Dayton Code of General Ordinances 
c. The AFSCME Collection 1937-1970. Archives of Labor 
and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University 
d. Civil Service Commission Annual Reports, City of 
Dayton, Ohio 
e. Structured interviews with city and union officials 
f. Labor relations confidential questionnaire 
-9- 
Secondary sources are drawn from local, state and federal 
government demographic and economic analysis, local and national 
print media and related scholarly literature. 
Significance and Limitations of the Study — It must be noted that 
using a case study approach limits the extent to which the 
findings and conclusion can be generalized to other situations. 
For example, in the case under study, the state's failure to 
legitimize public bargaining has resulted in a dearth of interest 
at the state and local level in collecting data on the experience 
of organized public employees. Thus, the only available data 
source that systematically documents the altered employment 
relationship is the collective bargaining agreement. 
Other issues affecting the research effort are reliability 
and representativeness of the data. For example, neither the City 
or DPSU would permit the researcher to review records or files 
which were maintained by them on the on-going collective 
bargaining process. Secondly, the reliability and representa¬ 
tiveness of the survey analyses was affected by two factors. The 
researcher had to rely on the Union to distribute mail-in 
questionnaires to the bargaining unit employees. Since a poor 
response rate is recognized as the greatest disadvantage of the 
mailed questionnaire, the resultant low rate of return (which will 
be more fully discussed in Chapter IV) prevented a robust analyses 
of the rank and file's perceptions and opinions. 
-10- 
Nevertheless, the significance of this study is the 
systematic description of the facts and characteristics of a given 
population, in this case DPSU Local 101 rank and file, and the 
public labor policy that forms the context for their employment 
with the city. In addition, the documentation and analysis of 
formal bargaining outcomes and rank and file perceptions can be 
utilized in future studies that examine the impact of Ohio's 
comprehensive statewide labor policy upon municipalities like 
Dayton which have evolved its own labor relations policy and 
practices . 
The organization of the study begins with a selective 
review of the literature in order to provide background for a 
critique of the functions of collective bargaining that is central 
to the analysis. Chapter II is a brief overview of the 
demographic, economic and governmental environment that forms the 
context of the labor policy. Chapter III provides an examination 
of the legislated ordinances which formalized a previously tacit 
labor relations arrangement, and the subsequent effect this policy 
change had on the administrative structure. Chapter IV will 
present a content analysis of the negotiated outcomes contained in 
the contracts formulated by DPSU and Dayton management during the 
period 1969-1981. Results of the survey analysis will include the 
presentation of raw data collected from the questionnaire and an 
evaluative analysis of the data. In Chapter V the entire study is 
summarized and implications of the research are discussed. 
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Review of Related Literature — Public policy toward public sector 
labor relations and unionism has undergone several distinct 
formulations within the last twenty years that is paralled by the 
changing configuration of the issues presented in the literature. 
As a selective literature survey reveals, conceptualization of the 
public sector labor problematic, with few exceptions, exhibits an 
overt management perspective. Beyond acknowledging what has to be 
considered an obvious fact, a major contention is advanced that a 
similar bias pervades the collective bargaining process which 
lends a chimeric quality to the descriptions and prescriptions of 
bargaining's impact on the public service and employment 
relationship. This chapter explores the above assertion by 
delineating how problematics have been defined in this area and 
positing an alternative interpretation regarding the functions of 
collective bargaining. 
With the advent of increased public union membership and 
the concomitant legitimation of collective bargaining, assessement 
of the political implications of the phenomenon have varied. 
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Initially the explanations reflected a common assumption 
succinctly capsulized by Eugene F. Berrodin: 
Some observers believe collective bargaining 
will result in greater participation by 
employees in the decision-making process of 
government. They foresee a kind of industrial 
democracy in the public employment 
relationship. 
This observation was made in 1968, less than six years after the 
passage of the highly influential Executive Order 10688 (which 
legitimized a limited type of collective bargaining of federal 
employees) and research interest in this new field had only just 
begun. However, as noted by Levine, et al in 1977: 
Like most emergent concerns in the social 
sciences, public sector collective bargaining 
suffers from preparadigmatic fragmentation 
i.e., the failure of large groups of scholars 
to coalesce around common approaches, 
frameworks, and theories. Instead, the field 
has been dominated by journalistic accounts of 
crisis events, impassioned moralizing and a 
pronounced melioristic orientation. 
As a result a caveat issued by Berrodin is seldom reflected in the 
analytical treatment of this subject: 
While greater participation by employee 
organizations in the employment relationship 
will occur, it is by no means certain that 
institutionalized bargaining will not result 
in a new formalism with its regidities and 
vested interests. 
Eugene Berrodin "The Future of Merit Systems," in 
Collective Bargaining for Public Employees, edited by Herbert L. 
Marx, Jr. (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1969). p7 185. 
^Charles H. Levine, James L. Perry, and John J. DeMarco, 
"Collective Bargaining in Municipal Governments" An Interorgani- 
zational Perspective," in Managing Human Resources: A Challenge 
Governments, edited by Charles ÎT Levine. ((Beverly Hills : Sage 
Publications, 1977), p. 160. 
Q 
Berrodin, op. cit., p. 185. 
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The argument that this omission stems from "preparadigmatic 
fragmentation" seems correct, as far as it goes. Levine, et al 
are typical of mainstream social scientists who believe the 
corrective for biased research is a more sophisticated methodology 
"that captures the principal dimensions of collective bargaining 
episodes while retaining sensitivity to the distinctive features 
and commonalties between bargaining in the private sector and in 
Q 
government." This approach reduces the issue to a methodology 
problematic which assumes that basic agreement has been reached 
concerning the primary problems raised by the development of 
unionisms and collective bargaining in the public sector. And to 
some extent, an argument could be advanced that a nascent paradigm 
was extant, particularly between 1962-1975, and was captured in a 
series of research projects authorized by the Brookings 
Institution. 
Looking at unionism in government, the project produced 
three major books: The Unions and the Cities by Harry H. 
Wellington and Ralph K. Winter in 1967; Managing Local Government 
Under Union Pressure by David Stanley and Carole L. Cooper in 
1972; and Public Employee Unionism: Structures, Growth, Policy by 
Jack Steiber in 1973. Steiber's book is a descriptive analysis of 
five classifications of public employee unions that are compared 
in terms of structure, growth, and policies. 
9 
Levine, op. cit., p. 160. 
It excludes 
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discussing unions comprised of teachers and transit workers 
because the former has been (and continued to be) the subject of 
extensive documentation and the latter has a long history of 
collective bargaining. Stanley's book explores the issue from a 
personnel management and administration position raising questions 
about the "effect union pressures are having on local government 
administration [and] what this means for civil service systems, 
for pay-setting processes, for budget planning, and for decisions 
on manning and workloads..."*® 
Probably the most influential of the three books was the 
first in this series authored by Wellington and Winter. The 
Unions and the Cities focused its attention on the "theoretical 
and practical problems of law, political science, and economics" 
while underscoring the need for "regulation of government-union 
relations."** Given that the theoretical premise of the study 
was democratic pluralism within a capitalist context, priority was 
accorded to the issue of sovereignty and the ethical and/or moral 
issue of how the introduction of collective bargaining in 
government affected the "public interest." Growing out of this 
framework, the core of the book addressed the "applicability of 
collective bargaining to the public sector"; put forth a strident 
objection to the philosopy "...that there...is [no] difference 
between the sectors (private vs. public);" and the corollary 
*®David Stanley and Carole L. Cooper, Managing Local 
Government Under Union Pressure, (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1962), p. viii. 
**Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, The Unions 
and the Cities, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 2. 
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"... claim...that the considerations determining what collective 
bargaining policy should be are virtually identical in private and 
12 
public employment..." 
The book, in other words, questioned the probability of 
reconciling the prevailing socio-political arrangements with a 
process of collective bargaining and unionism as similarly 
practiced in the private sector without significant modifications 
in content. According to the authors, since one cannot separate 
collective bargaining and the political process (read interest 
group politics), an unmodified acceptance of the industrial model 
of collective bargaining from the private sector would result in 
the institutionalization of public union power beyond their 
representational size in the general population. (Italics 
added) It has to be noted here that Wellington and Winter 
expounded the latter view at a time when there was a dearth of 
research on public unionism, consequently their assumptions 
regarding the outcome of public sector collective bargaining had 
little empirical foundation. 
Nevertheless, this presumption evoked little or no 
disagreement as subsequent research tended to either reinforce or 
repudiate the basic theme established in Unions and the Cities, 
namely the primary "political" problem engendered by the practice 
of unionism, particularly collective bargaining, was the 
12Ibid, pp. 2-3. 
l3Ibid, pp. 29-31. 
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attainment of "disproportional union power" for public employee 
organizations. 
Thus between 1967-1975 the following parameters were 
discernible in regard to analysis of public unionism: 
1. collective bargaining's effect upon the principle of 
"sovereignty" — often discussed under a heading 
questioning the "legitimacy" of collective bargaining 
in government 
2. delineating the distinctions between private and 
public employment which caused differences in the 
model of collective bargaining applicable to each 
sector 
3. The utility of the industrial model of collective 
bargaining for the public sector because of the 
attendant use of the "strike weapon" 
4. the a priori political power public unions enjoyed 
vis-a-vis other interest groups making demands upon the 
government's resources 
5. and an implicit concern to develop a body of rules, 
regulations, and procedures that would ensure 
maintenance of public management perogatives in 
controlling the development of policymaking. 
Consequently, even those authors who espoused a more 
liberal attitude toward public unions tended to keep their 
writings within the parameters outlined above. For example, Spero 
and Cappazolla^ speak of unionism in terms of the need for 
public employees to share in the decision-making process with 
public managers because of the latters' historically 
"paternalistic" and "arbitrary" behavior vis-a-vis public employees 
14 
Sterling A. Spero and John M. Capozzalo, The Urban 
Company and its Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in 
Local Government Labor Relations. (New York: Dunellen Publishing, 
1983) . 
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What these authors emphasized was the potential ability of unions 
to breakdown the authoritative control of public managers. Public 
unionism could be viewed as a "counter-bureaucratization" process 
that could offset the "entrenched power" of unresponsive 
"bureaucrats." Since public employees were directly affected by 
the growth of "administrative control," a movement emphasizing 
collective action could not be considered intolerable. So, to the 
extent that collective bargaining could help restore the civil 
liberties of public employees (particularly in the areas of due 
process and equal representation) as well as help them maintain 
economic parity with the private sector, it was legitimate 
activity.^ 
While Spero and Cappazolla constructed an adequate defence 
for the development of public unionism by introducing the notion 
of "counter-bureaucratization," they did not reject or question 
the basic premises that circumscribed the debate, i.e., democratic 
pluralism within a capitalist context, the inviolability of state 
sovereignty, public vs. private distinctions, etc. Moreover, in 
this effort to refute the propositions articulated in the 
15 
ibid, pp. 312-313. 
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inf luential Brookings studies, the authors suggested that public 
unions actually had limited goals (namely traditional trade union 
economism) and therefore could be accomodated within the framework 
of democratic pluralism. The basic problem was "...differentiat¬ 
ing between 'legitimate' bargaining issues and working conditions 
and questions of public policy in the constitutional domain of the 
political authorities and their legally designated agents. 
Who was to do the "differentiating" and the procedures to be used 
in this process was left unexplored and unanswered. 
To some extent the influences of the Brookings Institution 
series can be attributed to the low priority given to empirical 
studies of an area as specific as public unionism. Despite the 
dramatic nature of public employees strikes, the issue of public 
unionism during the 1960's and early 1970's had to compete for 
scholarly attention that was focused on Black demands for "civil 
rights" and the protest against military intervention in Vietnam. 
However in the middle and late 1970's, these concerns had been 
eclipsed by the public's strident reaction against "taxes [that 
were] too high and [a] government "that was" wasteful..."^ 
16 Ibid, pp. 312-313. 
^ Stanley Aronowitz, "The Labor Movement and the Left 
in the United States," Socialist Review 44 (March-April, 1970). 
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With the entire process of centralization and bureaucracy "open" 
to debate, the research regarding the role of public unions within 
this process increased and seemed to take on a different 
emphasis. 
For instance, in 1972 the same constellation that had 
sponsored the initial Brookings series on unionism in government 
sponsored another project carried out by the UCLA Law 
18 Review. This study was primarily concerned with empirically 
evaluating the impact of unionism on the political process. After 
almost ten years of presumed public union power, the conclusions 
reached in this project indicated "the problem of union power 
seems more an emergent possibility than a present reality...[and 
it is unlikely] that many of the smaller unions would ever possess 
excessive political power." Although unionism and collective 
bargaining did not preclude a reorganization of relations between 
certain levels of public managers vis-a-vis public employees, the 
evidence produced by the study noted that the ability of public 
unions to "disrupt" the established political process was minimal, 
therefore, the prevailing socio-economic arrangements were likely 
to remain intact. 
In line with this point of view, the literature following 




collective bargaining and politics 
UCLA Law Review 19 (August 1972). 
in 
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unionism and collective bargaining as one of an administrative 
matter as opposed to a political problem. In other words, within 
fifteen years (if one uses the arbitrary dates 1962-1979), the 
issue of unionism in the public sector has become in the 
traditional social science literature "dépolitici zed. " An 
illustration of this shift in emphasis can be found in the work of 
Felix A. Nigro, a contributor to the literature on public 
administration and now in the area of public labor relations. 
Writing in 1971, Nigro discussed the effects of 
collective bargaining in the public sector within the theoretical 
framework of the principle of sovereignty, the problem engendered 
by the delegation of authority, diffusion of power, etc. He was 
concerned with the effects "bilateralism" (as he labelled 
collective bargaining) would have upon elected officials' 
representational ability and the whole notion of the diminution of 
"democracy in the total political system." Nigro also 
discussed the decline in the power of the civil service commission 
(without acknowledging the commission's questionable role as 
spokesperson for public employees.) Also of great import was the 
unions' "presumed" ability to coerce public managers and elected 
public officials into "excessive wage demands" because of the 
government's position as "the sole provider" of certain essential 
social services and public goods. 
19 
Felix Nigro, "The Implications for Public 
Administration," in The Dimensions of Public Administration, 
edited by Joseph A. Uveges, Jr. (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 
1975). 
20 
Ibid, p. 348. 
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Ref lecting the trend of research in this area, Nigro's 
analysis was unsubstantiated by empirical evidence although the 
need for such work was acknowledged. Presumably the contentions 
of the article were based upon some empirical work, yet Nigro did 
not identify case studies or field research which may have 
facilitated his call for research into the "alteration of the 
relative shares of different individuals and groups in the 
21 
formulation and implementation of public policy." 
However, exhibiting almost a complete reversal in attitude 
in an article written in 1977, Nigro (along with Lloyd G. Nigro) 
noted that present research led to the conclusion that unions 
22 
posed no 'threat' to the political status quo. Moreover, in 
a statement of candor that is left undeveloped, it was suggested 
that collective bargaining could be useful in disciplining the 
work force in the public sector. This latter role for unions grew 
out of a recognition by these organizations that their demands 
must have limitations: 
The present situation is one in which the 
unions, while not in full retreat, confront 
managements which insist that they have little 
additional to give to the workers and indeed 
want to take back some of the benefits that 
• • 23 
they granted in previous contracts. 
Unfortunately, the authors fail to elaborate upon the 
implicit theme of social control evoked by the above assertion. 
2lIbid., p. 347. 
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Unionism," in Managing Human Resources: A Challenge to Urban 
Governments, edited by Charles H. Levine (Bevery Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1977), p. 148. 
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Instead, the problem is the coalescence of professional employees 
and unionism. What generated this concern is the potential threat 
to "management rights" posed by the collegial principle of 
professional workers. However, this development is not 
necessarily viewed as antithetical. Professionalism and unionism 
are mutually reinforcing; the union helps to 
achieve professional goals. Many professionals 
choose government employment in order to be 
able to contribute public service; loyalty to 
profession is combined with the zeal to help 
the community. They identify with the mission 
of their organizations with an intensity seldom 
found in professionals working for private 
entities. And this is why the management 
rights concept is threatened by collective 
bargaining much more in government than in the 
private sector. 
Thus, with the legitimation of unionism since the late 
1960's and the subsequent research indicating that unionism and 
collective bargaining did not disrupt the "normal political 
process," Nigro and Nigro see the new obstacle or primary problem 
as the ability of the organized professional worker to usurp the 
management prerogative of public administrators. Yet, as in the 
previous article, the only challenge the authors have to this 
development is given in the form of an ideological statement: 
The ultimate management is the electorate and 
employees at all levels of the organization 
have a responsibility for serving the 
24 
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public.. .Obviously in any organization someone 
must have a final decision-making 
responsibility, so "administrators" are 
necessary... 
However, Nigro and Nigro seem willing to accept the involvement of 
"professional workers" in policy decisions and even hint that the 
consequences may be the "elimination" of administrators where the 
organization is comprised primarily of professionals: 
...It is entirely appropriate in government 
for...administrators to share this 
responsibility with the staff members whose 
special training makes it possible for them to 
contribute a great deal in matters of agency 
mission. This is why collective bargaining in 
government is so congenial to so many 
professional workers; it provides a means of 
both making concrete and enforcing the 
collegial principle. 
It seems the distinction is being made that where workers have the 
"expertise" it is permissible, perhaps even desirable that they 
become involved in policymaking formulation and implementation. 
Ironically nothing is said about such intervention by "non-elected 
public officials" circumvents the "public interest." More 
significantly, this encouragement of "elitism" leaves out the vast 
majority of public employees from taking part in decision-making 
at the policy level. Another interesting feature of this article 
is that except for the initial reassurance that all is well for 




the "normal political process," nothing is said about the 
political clout of public employee unions. It seems that the 
question of the political implications of collective bargaining 
are so minimal that they need not be discussed. 
Another illustration of this shift in emphasis is reflected 
in the work of Lewm and Horton. in their critique of the 
conventional literature and practice of public labor relations, 
the authors implicitly convey the apologetics of a groups of 
analysts labelled here as administrative theorists. According to 
this view, the principal shortcoming said to inhere in the initial 
problematic was the presumed detrimental impact of collective 
bargaining that pervaded the literature and the concomitant 
perspective built upon the following assumptions. 
First there was the notion that union resistance to change 
impacts upon governmental work rules and productivity in such a 
way that public managers are unable to achieve an increase in the 
"quality of public services". Secondly, there was the belief that 
fragmentation of government authority weakens public management's 
position vis-a-vis the union in bargaining. And thirdly, that 
collective bargaining has disproportionately stimulated exorbitant 
wage costs in the public sector. 
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According to Lewin, these assumptions are questionable 
because they arose from an inadequate conceptualization of the 
collective bargaining process. Negative consequences of 
bargaining tend to be emphasized primarily because management 
appears to be restricted in the exercise of its prerogatives. 
Bargaining, however, is viewed "as a fixed or zero-sum game in 
which a gain for one side represents a loss for the other." 
Moreover, the "a priori nature of assumptions growing out of this 
conceptual confusion leads to biased research that implicitly 
presumes only one pattern of union impact on public sector 
28 
management will occur..." 
An alternative advocated by Lewin is to view collective 
bargaining as a "problematic [wherein] the negotiation process 
becomes a variable-sum game in which a variety of joint 
consequences is possible." Utilizing this integrative bargaining 
perspective it is possible to accept that "the parties bargain 
over problems, and both management and the union may win or lose 
as a result of the decisions reached in collective negotiations." 
It also accepts the feasibility that decision-making structure may 
need to be changed to correct the extant fragmentary authority of 
public managers union. As to questions about the "essential" 
nature of public services and the effect collective bargaining is 
having upon compensation costs, Lewin suggests these are 
28 
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"exaggerate[d] [and] divert attention from important variables 
that must be examined further in order to better understand the 
nature of employment relations in government and the extent to 
which these diverge from those in the private sector." 
With this in mind, analysts could not completely disregard 
the experience developed in private sector and industrial 
relations. For example, Horton, et al make a cogent point 
regarding this matter: 
Observers of the labor scene implicitly assume 
a model of private sector labor relations and 
manpower management that describes only the 
manufacturing sector and more precisely, a 
model descriptive of large production firms 
and large industrial unions. 
They go on to say that this circumscribes consideration of 
alternative models that suggest other outcomes for the collective 
bargaining process that are found within the experience of private 
sector unionism. For instance, analogous situations can be found 
in the private sector for the problem of the "presumed inordinate 
amount of political power" said to be the results of public sector 
bargaining that is reinforced by traditional methods of lobbying, 
end-runs, etc." 
The coal miner's union, as a large stockholder 
in several coal producing and transportation 
companies, has 'set' on both sides of the 
bargaining table; the garment unions and the 
teamsters in local trucking, are powerful 
enough in their respective industries to 
influence small employers directly as well as 
through collective bargaining. 
^Ibid, p. 310. 
^Horton, op. cit., p. 503. 
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Thus cognizance of the variations in private sector labor 
relations necessitates an assumption that a similar development is 
possible in the public sector. The need to consider alternative 
bargaining outcomes is also suggested by the "diversity...with 
respect to control devices, organizational structures, services, 
occupational and work groups" found in the public sector. 
Accordingly, a research model is advocated that directs attention 
to the "exchange or redistribution of resources that usually (but 
not always) accompany a political decision." Similarly, Lewin 
contends 
The key issue is not the emergence of formal 
collective bargaining and/or the trade of 
decision-making power between mangement and 
organized workers; instead, it is the impact 
of joint decision-making through the bargaining 
process on public management and thus public 
services. 
In their attempt to move the problem of analyzing collective 
bargaining beyond the one-dimensional perception of "zero-sum 
games", Lewin and Horton, et al reflect the implicit bias of 
rationalism generally associated with the "depoliticized 
administative" perspective. Within this context the bureaucracy 
is "viewed as an 'instrument,' i.e., a rationally designed means 
for the realization of explicit goals..." - in this instance the 
delivery of public services. Because the bureaucracy "is regarded 
32 
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as a tool [it's] a structure of manipulable parts, each of which 
is separately modifiable with a view to enhancing the efficiency 
of the whole." With some form of collective bargaining an 
established fact throughout the various public bureaucracies, 
attention needs to be directed toward illuminating how the process 
can contribute to the overall efficiency of achieving the goals of 
administrative agencies rather then presuming deleterious results. 
Emerging from this view is an emphasis on bargaining, which 
presupposes that management and labor are not necessarily in 
direct conflict, but recognize that there are common problem areas 
in which they must cooperate. 
A countervailing perspective is offered by a substantially 
smaller group of radical analysts within the Marxist tradition. 
According to this view, public unionism is potentially progressive 
because it permits an examination of the role of the state in an 
era of advanced capitalism, principal concerns of contemporary 
Marxist analysis. 
In an article entitled "Public Sector Unionism" 
Johnston'1^ utilizes a Marxist analysis to put forth a 
distinctively different conceptualization of the political nature 
of public sector unionism. First he asserts that one aspect of 
"...analysis of the state...usually ignored is the state as work 
place." Within this context state workers experience unique 
33 ... Bengt Abrahmsson, Bureaucracy or Participation, 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. 1977), pp. 185-198. 
■^Paul Johnston, Monthly Review 30 (September 1978): 
1-17. 
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social relations "...to taxpayers, to the electorate, to consumers 
(or victims) of public work, and to state power itself." In an 
application of Marxist lexicon which attempts to distinguish 
various social categories, Johnston characterizes public employees 
as follows: 
The public worker works for government or 
state power. Labor power is sold to the 
government for the production, not of 
commodities, but of social-use values which 
are goods and services defined as useful to 
society at large by those who hold state 
power. What is to be produced is determined 
through political decisions not by the 
economic 'laws' of the markets. 
Consequently, any "Power exercised on behalf of public workers 
must be exerted against the state itself." 
Another important element in Johnston's discussion is the 
delineation of legitimations (he terms them 'myths') used to 
support as well as "conceal" the relations between workers and 
employers in both the private and public sector. 
The private sector myth is 'a fair day's pay 
for a fair day's work.' It holds that in the 
sale of labor power equal confronts, and is 
exchanged for equals, and each receives his or 
her just due. This conceals the fact that the 
'day's work' produces more than the 'day's 
pay' — it reproduces and expands capital 
itself. [Whereas in the public sector the] 
crucial legitimizing myth is the myth of 
democracy. This holds, quite simply, that the 
state services all people impartially. It 
holds that all people have an equal share of 
political power and an equal voice in the laws 





In order to accept Johnston's analysis of the differences 
between private and public sector work one has to uncritically 
accept his application of Marxian class analysis to the public 
administrative apparatus. With the polemics aside, however, 
Johnston's contribution is by way of offering a critique of the 
primary assumptions that underline the traditional literature's 
position on the distinction between public and private employment 
and the attendant effect upon unionism. Foremost in this regard 
is Johnston's discussion of the critical issue of "legitimations," 
for on the surface, his analysis appears to parallel the 
analytical separation between economics and politics encountered 
in mainstream social analysis. But this resemblance is corrected 
when he indicates how "myths" obscure the economic and political 
nexus : 
In the private sector, work is totally 
surrounded by the commodity market. Who does 
what to whom seems to be determined by 
impersonal economic forces. The human 
relationship between producer and product, 
producer and consumer, producer and manager of 
production, etc. are all concealed behind a 
veil of buying and selling... 
The resultant "commodity market fetish" makes the "market place" 
something autonomous, divorced from the actions, motivations, and 
goals of people, and therefore, apolitical. This type of 




public sector because "Who does what to whom is determined not by 
economic 'laws' but by political power based on explicitly 
justified views of social reality and social needs." 
According to Johnston, the object of public sector labor is 
people and not, as in the basic productive industries of the 
private sector, the production of commodities. This distinction 
produces a "qualitative" (he calls it "enhanced") difference in 
the meaning of "work" performed by public workers. Combining the 
push for democratization of the work place with this "presumed" 
"enhanced meaning of work" you have the potential for public 
employees to begin 
critically defining the object of their 
activity (which, as pointed out above, is 
society itself) [and] the workers can promote 
discussion, take a position, and demand 
democratic control of what should be done in 
connection with their work. 
Consequently, for Johnston, the introduction of unionism in the 
public sector could "open-up" the decision-making apparatus to 
workers who, first of all, are employed by the state, and 
therefore have an immediate concern with gaining access to the 
decision-making arena. Moreover, public unionism, as envisioned 
by Johnston, could also lead to an elevation of "consciousness" 
among public employees that would result in raising questions 
about the unequal distribution of goods and services and 
38 Ibid. 
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ultimately the unequal distribution of political power that 
perpetuates the former condition. 
There are some problems with Johnston's formulations. 
First, he attempts to place the public sector labor relationship 
Proscrutean-like into the traditional class analysis model, i.e., 
two antagonistic social forces whose struggle defines the social 
reality. Secondly, in the discussion of the relationship of 
public employees to the productive process, there is the 
questionable assumption about the monolithic control exercised by 
"those who hold state power;" the ability of public employees, 
through their unions, to critique public policies that might 
ultimately jeopardize their employment within the administrative 
apparatus; and the ability of public workers to identify 
fundamental structual problems inherent in advanced monopoly 
capitalism simply because they work with people and do not produce 
objects for the commodity market. Thirdly, Johnston's argument 
about the differences between public and private work hinges on 
the former's "enhanced meaning" which seems in some ways simply a 
reformulation of the "public spirit" ethic formerly used to imbue 
public work with a measure of prestige while at the same time 
justifying significantly lower financial compensation for public 
employees. 
-33- 
Finally, although he correctly identifies the need to end neglect 
of the public sector workers and workplace by radical anaylsts, no 
conceptual guidance is proffered for analyzing the organization of 
government work. Nevertheless, Johnston's discussion of public 
sector unionism is useful as a theoretical alternative to the 
prevailing wisdom of conventional literature. 
Yet, as it often happens there is some similarity of focus 
in the work of the "radical" and "conservative" social analysts; 
the political implications of public unionism should form the 
crucial problematic. Where they disagree is on the desireability 
of the change that must accompany an expansion of participation. 
Wellington and Winter, for example, concede that collective 
bargaining would expand employee participation in the 
decision-making process. But they view such a development as 
deleterious for duly elected public officials and their designated 
agents charged with the responsibility of formulating and 
implementing public policy that reflects a "consensus" of the 
"public will." Therefore, such participation should be 
stringently controlled. 
Yet it is not only that collective bargaining would 
incorporate public employees into the decision-making arena, but 
it might also allow for a great deal more "public scrutiny" of the 
bureaucracy by the general population. This point is made, for 
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instance, in a discussion of the "limitations" of the strike 
weapon in the public sector: 
But precisely because the private strike is an 
economic weapon, it is disciplined by the 
market and the benefit/unemployment trade-off 
that imposes. And because in the public 
sector the employee strike is a political 
weapon, (its sole purpose is to exert 
political pressure on municipal officials) it 
is subject only to the restraints by the 
political process and they are on the whole 
less limiting and less disciplinary than those 
of the market... (emphasis added) 
Here you have the idea, subtly argued, for an authoritative 
management of public policy because the "public" will simply 
"capitulate to union inconvenience" rather than evaluate the 
merits of union demands that act as justifications for a strike 
action. The argument also implies a need to limit public 
participation in the decision-making process at the level of 
policy formulation and implementation that could emerge from 
unionism and collective bargaining. In other words, if public 
employees manage to "open up" the decision-making process within 
the bureaucracy, then the public has every right to take a 
position on the correctness of union and management stands. So 
the objection to collective bargaining by proponents of the status 
quo stems not only from the idea that public employees should not 
"interfere" in management prerogatives, but the involvement of the 
public-at-large that unionism may engender is also viewed with 
39 Wellington and Winter, op. cit., p. 26. 
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trepidation. And to a large extent, this conclusion lends support 
to Johnston's hypothesis regarding the potential of public 
unionism. 
On the other hand, Johnston's overtly pro-union article is 
useful because of its emphasis on moving beyond the preoccupation 
with the legitimation process and/or the maintenance of management 
prerogatives and suggesting, albeit in an exaggerated manner, 
another scenario. Collective bargaining is a way to "politicize" 
the bureaucracy via an advocacy position adopted by public 
employees for such things as equalization in the delivery of goods 
and services and/or the development of coalitions between 
employees and consumers-clients in public dabate over questions of 
public policy that might grow out of issues raised in the 
collective bargaining process. Unfortunately, Johnston's scenario 
does not adequately address a crucial element in this 
transformation, namely how will collective bargaining be 
incorporated into the bureaucratic structure? And more 
importantly, how can collective bargaining retain whatever 
"progressive" character it supposedly had within this context once 
it is institutionalized? 
Recapitulating briefly, the problematic of public sector 
labor relations and unionism has experienced a shift in emphasis. 
Initially research was concerned with assessing the political 
implications of the phenomenon. To a few, this meant discerning 
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how collective bargaining would not only be instrumental in 
democratizing public bureaucracies but how it had the potential to 
extend participatory democracy beyond the administrative apparatus 
of government. However the predominant view was concerned to 
point out how incorporation of collective bargaining disrupted 
extant political arrangements. Hence the aim of the arguments 
advanced by proponents of this position seemed to be the creation 
of justifications for the containment of collective bargaining to 
ensure maintenance of the status quo. 
Marring the early attempts to assess the political 
ramifications of bargaining was the a priori assumptions regarding 
unionization and the collective bargaining process and the 
attendant polemical nature of the discussions regarding 
representative government. A less dogmatic view of the situation 
is offered in the current apolitical rationalistic approach of the 
administrative theorists. Treating as secondary the preoccupation 
with politics, proponents of this position appear to view 
bargaining as primarily an "administrative question" amenable to 
resolution within the bureaucratic organization. Grounded in the 
theoretical and practical experiences of industrial relations, 
administrative theorists are highly critical of conventional 
containment arguments that emphasize the deleterious nature of 
bilateralism because such a posture is seen as obfuscating 
research and policymaking that would facilitate "consideration 
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of alternative models" and "outcome for the collective bargaining 
process" in the public sector. 
After examining the fluctuation in parameters and focus of 
the public sector labor reform problematic, it is evident that a 
major flaw is the selective historical perspective exhibited by 
the majority of analysts. Even though the private sector analogy 
is evoked, the conclusions drawn about the implications of 
bargaining do not cohere with the actual experiences of the 
private sector - a point cogently argued by the administrative 
theorists. Nevertheless, what appears operative is the 
utilization of what Stone cites as the ideal model of industrial 
democracy as a strawman to justify subsequent containment 
strategies that have been implemented in public policy. According 
to Stone, industrial democracy (or industrial pluralism) 
...is the view that collective bargaining is 
self-government by management and labor; 
management and labor are considered to be 
equal parties who jointly determine the 
conditions of the sale of labor power. The 
collective bargaining process ...function[s] 
like a legislature [wherein the parties] 
engage in debate and compromise, and together 
legislate the rules under which the workplace 
will be governed. 
Since it is difficult to prove intentionally, this suggests 
a somewhat remarkable ignorance not only of collective bargaining, 
which is crucial to the argument advanced, but also of the 
^Katherine Van Wezel Stone, "The Post-War Paradigm in 
American Labor Law," Yale Labor Journal 90 (June 1981):1512. 
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implicit functions that have been identified as concomitant 
features of the process that would negate both the worst case 
scenarios initially cited by conservatives and the exaggerated 
democratization claims advanced by radical analysis. 
While the literature is replete with discussions of how 
labor reform was impelled by militant worker demands, the 
subsequent expansion of employee rights in the workplace has 
engendered a labor relations system that evinces a unique duality. 
There is an acknowledgement of the idea of industrial democracy 
(similar to that expressed by Stone) that, albeit, ultimately 
rests on management decision-making at the same time there is an 
active promotion of workers' rights in certain well-defined and 
circumscribed contexts. 
The latter rights, which have become the raison d'etre of 
unions, includes: 1) raising substandard wages; 2) eliminating 
discrimination and favoritism in the treatment of workers and 
establishing a non-managerial conception of equitable standards, 
i.e., the principle of seniority in layoffs and promotions; 3) 
providing a juridical mechanism for grievances outside the 
arbitrary decisons of management; and 4) guaranteeing basic 
security and welfare for the individual employee through "fringe 
benefits" like medical care, pensions, and supplementary 
unemployment benefits. 
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However, collective bargaining is basically perceived as a 
process by which employees, by the use of concerted economic 
force, obtain higher wages and other economic benefits than they 
would otherwise receive.^ Thus the agreement constitutes 
primarily a written context for the monetary concessions 
extracted. While there is little argument that monetary concerns 
are (and have been) a driving force underlying workers' desire to 
organize and bargain, the establishment of the negotiated economic 
agenda occurs, theoretically only once within a specified time 
frame and therefore, affords employees and their union representa¬ 
tives minimal opportunity for shared governance of the workplace. 
Nevertheless, as the emergence of public sector bargaining 
illustrates, there remains a pervasive residue of opposition to 
the concept of bargaining which goes beyond the mutual setting of 
wages and other fringe benefits. This opposition, which usually 
emanates from management, occurs because the agreement is viewed 
as an intrusion on the presumed prerogative of unilateral 
management control of the workforce and the work product. Thus, 
collective bargaining is a method by which employees participate 
in what would otherwise be a system of unilateral management 
rulemaking and administration. 
The rules subjected to bargaining fall into two categories. 
The first, and predominant category consists of rules specifying 
^David Feller, "A General Theory of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement," California Law Review 61 (1973):663, 
769-771. Although Feller's treatise is predicated upon the 
private sector industrial model, the underlying theme of his 
discussion can be applied to any analysis of complex 
organizations. 
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management action or limiting it. This includes rules with 
respect to the payment of wages and benefits, setting hours of 
work or governing scheduling and manning. Seniority provisions, 
for example, are rules governing management in the exercise of its 
function of determining which employee shall fill a vacancy and 
which employee to lay off when there must be a reduction in the 
workforce. The second type of rules are those governing employee 
conduct. In most instances these are rules related to discipline, 
however the most salient example generally set out in the 
agreement is the no-strike clause. 
A key factor in limiting management action is an 
enforcement mechanism which can cause a reversal of action which 
alllegedly violates the rules. This system of adjudication and 
enforcement is commonly known as the grievance procedure. 
Generally, the initial collective bargaining agreement contains 
little more than rules governing employee conduct that correspond 
to existing employer policy or practice. As experience with the 
grievance procedures discloses problems or inequities in the 
application of the rules, or a need for additional rules, 
succeeding agreements will contain rules that have been amended, 
expanded, and clarified. 
Having outlined the structual features of the collective 
agreement, it is necessary to flush out some implications of this 
framework. Stone suggests that while labor reform (in both the 
private and public sectors) was originally brought into being in 
large measure because of worker insurgency, a fundamental premise 
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of the process developed to accomodate these new demands was that 
collective bargaining be functional for management. 
According to Feller, as a conduit for the formulation and 
administration of organizational rules, the collective agreement 
becomes an alternative method of control. As such it permits 
dispensing with ideologies of managerial control. In this regard 
Feller notes that 
The necessity of consent has created, over a 
period of years, changing ideologies to 
justify management's authority and the 
necessary ethic of work performance from a 
management perspective. The establishment of 
rules in a collective agreement can serve as a 
substitute for such ideologies. 
Secondly, by agreeing not to change rules expressly or implicitly 
covered by the agreement, management acquires a guarantee from the 
union, enforceable by law, that employees will forego, for the 
term of the agreement, their right to protest a rule, or its 
application by striking or engaging in other concerted activity. 
The end result obtains for management the latitude to act it would 
not otherwise have. 
Although Feller can be criticized for treating employees 
.  . . . 43 
and unions as passive participants of collective bargaining, 
his revisionist analysis promotes an alternative interpretation in 
that the usual obfuscation regarding the managerial intent and use 
/ JStone takes Feller to task for inconsistency and 
reification" contained in his analysis particularly because it is 
silent about the "contribution of unions,": "Although the crux of 
his theory is that collective bargaining represents the consent of 
the workers through their union to the work rules and conditions, 
most of his analysis of the nature of rules...is designed to show 
that the union has no actual effect on the rules." Stone, op. 
cit., p. 1556. 
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of bargaining is removed. For example, one implication is that 
while workers are invited and then authorized by law to articulate 
and advance their interests through self-organizations, their 
subsequent collective action is regulated by channeling it into 
narrow institutionalized forms. Also, a management rights' clause 
circumscribes the degree of employee and union participation 
possible by carving out a sheltered area of unreviewable employer 
prerogatives beyond the reach of input for the duration of the 
contract term. The major concessions obtained for this waiver is 
management's acquiesence to review of its action covered by the 
collective bargaining agreement via arbitration. Unlike the 
absolute limitation of the no-strike provision, actions not 
subject to arbitral review (anything outside the contract) can be 
effected with impunity. 
In a provacative essay, Stone also contends that collective 
bargaining fulfills an ideological function of legitimation by 
sustaining the myth that whatever conditions prevail in the 
workplace result from the "democratic process" of joint rulemaking 
between employee and employer. Thus the presumption of consent 
implies acquiesence 
...not only [in] the particular terms of the 
agreement but also the entire network of 
procedures that surrounds the creation of the 
agreement, its enforcement, and its 
renegotiation. The particular rules that are 
generated by these processes are thought to 
express both sides' participation and both 
sides' consent to every |ij>pect of the 
labor-management relationship. 
44 Ibid . 
-43- 
One aftermath of this development is its elevation of form 
over substance. Despite evidence to the contrary, the notion of 
industrial democracy is equated with the implementation of the 
bargaining process alone because of the tendency to assume that 
procedural integrity guarantees equity of participation even 
though core issues are removed from the agenda and law and 
practice denotes unmistakable power disparaties between management 
and workers.^ 
Another consequence of this structural development is to 
virtually stifle any prospective union or employee initiative that 
could permit the transcendence of the customary emphasis on wages 
and benefits. This is primarily achieved by evoking the concept 
of management rights and upon this basis limiting the "agenda of 
negotiation" that is put forward for discussions. When the issues 
affecting working conditions are subcontracting and/or the 
introduction of new technology, such an exclusion is extremely 
critical. 
More importantly, what the preceding discourse suggests is 
the model of collective bargaining that has been constituted in 
the private sector experience and subsequently adopted in the 
public sector is imbued with a managerial bias designed to contain 
any substantive effort to effect joint decision-making in the 
workplace. And in this regard, such an outcome mirrors the 
principal concern of containment advocates in the public sector, 
^Karl E. Klare, "Labor Law and the Liberal Political 
Imagination", p. 56 Socialist Review 61 (March-April 1982). 
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making their arguments against the model's adaptability somewhat 
specious as this obvious mobilization of bias in theory and 
practice is seldom identified as a factor in the analysis of the 
institutionalization of public sector bargaining. 
CHAPTER II 
Investigation of the institutionalization of collective 
bargaining necessitates delineating the environmental context in 
which the phenomenon occurs. Toward this end, this chapter 
presents information on population changes in Dayton and the 
city's political and governmental structure. 
Dayton is located in the southwestern corner of Ohio in a 
standard metropolitan statistical area bearing its name. Within 
this SMSA, commonly known as the Miami Valley Region, are the 
counties of Greene, Miami, Preble, and Montgomery. Dayton is the 
largest municipality in Montgomery County which is the region's 
industrial, economic and political focal point. Along with 
Dayton, the county contains the cities of Kettering, Miamisburg, 
West Carrollton, Vandalia, Englewood, Oakwood, Trotwood, and 
Centerville. 
In 1960 Dayton's population was 262,332 but by 1970 had 
dropped to 244,564. This represented a population loss of 6.8 
percent. According to final estimates of the 1980 census, 
Dayton's current population is 203,588. See Table 1 
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Table 2 shows similar population losses were experienced by 
Montgomery County as a whole. The 1960 census showed Montgomery 
County's population to be 527,080. It rose to 608,413 in 1970 but 
began to decline in 1978 leaving 580,000 in the area. Again, the 
projected estimates of the 1980 census indicates the county 
population to be 571,697. 
As the preceding data illustrates, Montgomery County's 
population has been fluctuating since 1960. Nevertheless, despite 
suffering losses since 1970, the county's overall population trend 
has been one of growth. Table 3 shows a breakdown of the county's 
cities and concomitant changes in population between 1970 and 
1978. Along with Dayton, two other cities Kettering and Oakwood, 
lost population during this period. While the growth of the other 
cities was not spectacular, viewed within the context of the 
suburban-urban trend, Dayton's 21.20 percent decrease in 
population between 1970-1978 reinforces the pattern of urban 
decline experienced throughout cities of the north and midwest. 
Demographic changes have been facilitated by a gradual 
deindustrialization of Dayton's private economic sector. 
Historically, the bulk of the Dayton SMSA economy has been 
dominated by manufacturing industries associated with 
non-electrical machinery, printing and publishing. However, the 
spectre of deindustrialization which began to occur throughout the 
region's economy in the eary 1970's precipitated a noticeable 
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TABLE 1 
CITY OF DAYTON POPULATION CHANGES 
1960-1980 
YEAR POPULATION % OF CHANGE 
1960 262,332 - 
1970 244,564 -6.8 
1975 205,986 -15.8 
1980* 203,371 -17.0 
Source: Ohio Population Report Number of Inhabitants Urban and 
Rural Population and Miscellaneous Population Figures 
Nineteenth Federal Census, p. 7 
* Same source as cited below 
TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF POPULATION CHANGES FOR 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND CITY OF DAYTON 
YEAR DAYTON MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
1960 262,332 527,080 
1970 243,601 608,413 
1978 197,744 580,000 
1980 203,371 571,697 
Source: 1980 Census of Population, Volume 1, Characteristics of 
the Population, Chapter A, Number of Inhabitants, Ohio. 




POPULATION FIGURES FOR CITIES WITHIN 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO 
1978 
1978 1970 Number Percentage 
Centerville 16,971 10,333 6,639 64.25 
Englewood 11,035 7,885 3,150 39.95 
Kettering 76,976 71,864 -3,888 -5.51 
Miamisburg 15,878 14,797 1,082 7.31 
Oakwood 8,696 10,095 -1,398 -13.85 
Trotwood 7,912 6,997 915 13.08 
Vadalia 11,881 10,796 1,085 10.05 
West Carrollton 13,119 10,748 2,372 22.07 
Dayton 194,673 246,741 -52,067 -21.10 
Source: 1978 Ohio Population Estimates 
Department of Economic and Community Development, p. 22. 
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decline in manufacturing employment : 
[T]he majority of industries within the 
[regional] manufacturing sector recorded 
declines...Non-electrical machinery employment 
dropped from 38,048, a loss of 8,544 
employees, or 22.4 percent...Printing and 
publishing lost more than 2,000 employees (an 
18.7 percent drop), down to 8,839. 
By 1979 Dayton had been severely affected by the gradual 
erosion of manufacturing employment. For example, between 1970 
and 1979, the cluster of major employers either leaving the city 
entirely or affecting substantial workforce reductions included: 
Dayton Tire and Rubber Company (scheduled to close), Dayton Press 
Inc. (scheduled to close), Inland Division (reduction-in-force), 
Dayton Steel Foundry (reduction-in-force), Frigidaire Division of 
General Motors (closed), and National Cash Register (reduction-in- 
force). In the latter instance, conversion to computer-oriented 
production and distribution resulted in the loss of an estimated 
15,000 skilled and semi-skilled jobs. See Table 4 What also 
makes these economic dislocations noteworthy is that a number of 
these firms continue to be listed among Dayton principal 
taxpayers . 
According to the 1980 Municipal report, among the fifteen 
largest contributors are Chrysler Corporation, Dayton Press Inc., 
General Motors Corporation, Dayton Tire and Rubber Co., Duriron 
^Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission, "Industry 
in the Miami Regional", Technical Bulletin No. 3, Vol. 2, June 
1974, p. 21. 
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TABLE 4 
REDUCTIONS AND CLOSING OF 
MAJOR ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS IN DAYTON 
1970-1979 
Dayton Fire and Rubber Company (2,153)* 
Frigidaire Division GMC (6,000)* 
Standard Register Company (1,487)** 
Dayton Steel Foundry (1,154)** 
Inland Division (7,000)** 
Dayton Press Inc. (2,500)*** 
National Cash Register (15,000)**** 
* Number of people losing jobs as result of closing. 
** Number of people subject to reduction-in-force. 
*** Figure represents remaining workforce which originally 
totaled 7,800. 
**** Figure represents number of people dislocated when computer 
technology was introduced by company. 
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Co. Inc., Mead Corporation and National Cash Register Company. 
Finally, the preceding disruption in the private sector economy 
has been critical in Dayton because a historically pro-business 
attitude has permeated the political culture and shaped municipal 
institutions and citizenry expectations accordingly. 
Governmental Structure and Political Economy 
Dayton has a council-manager governmental structure 
generally described as "reformed." Formally, the city is governed 
by a four member City Commission: four commissioners and a mayor. 
The commissioners are 
elected on a nonpartisan, at-large basis for 
four overlapping terms. All policy matters 
are decided by the Commission, which is 
empowered by the City Charter to pass 
ordinances and resolutions, adopt regulations, 
and appoint the City Manager. 
Administration of the city is the primary responsibility of a 
commission-appointed professional manager. As the city's chief 
executive, the manager's duties include 
enforcing laws and ordinances, appointing and 
discharging all department heads and their 
subordinates on the basis of merit, 
controlling all administrative departments and 
divisions, attending meetings of the City 
Commissions and making recommendations to the 
Commissioners, preparing an annual budget and 
keeping the Commission fully advised on the 
financial condition and needs of the city and 
performing such other duties as the Commission 
requires. 
^City of Dayton, Ohio, "Almost everything you wanted 




The executive branch of city management also encompasses an Office 
of Management and Budget, an Office of Intergovernmental Affairs 
and a Planning Department. The City Manager has two assistant 
managers who are responsible for the two functional areas of 
government: Administrative Services and Community Services. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Although an examination of revenue data indicates that Dayton 
utilizes the traditional general property tax, users fees and 
miscellaneous charges, the two most lucrative sources have been 
the municipal income tax and intergovernmental assistance. 
According to Table 5, the public economy fluctuated between 
1971-1980. Relative high percentage increases in revenue occurred 
between 1971-1973 and during the years 1977 and 1979. However, in 
the intervening years, the rate of percentage change reflected 
decreases in available revenue, with a recent nadir of -1% in 
1980. The greatest contractions of the government's economy took 
place between 1973-1974; 1977-1978 and 1979-1980. 
A review of select sources reveals that the city income tax 
yielded 25-30% of total revenue during 1971-1980. See Table 6 
However, there was also an uneven percentage rate change in this 
tax. One explanation for the development was the increased rate 














TOTAL REVENUES (in Millions) 










$ 59,657. (a) (a) 
68,760. $ 9,103. 15.2 
78,900. 10,140. 14.7 
80,922. 2,022. 2.5 
87,011. 6,089. 7.5 
94,132. 7,121. 8.0 
111,531. 17,399. 18.4 
118,618. 7,087. 6.0 
134,121. 15,503. 13.0 
132,330. (1,791.) -1.0 
Data for Tables 5 through 8 obtained from City of 
Dayton, Ohio Annual Financial Report. January 1, 
1980 through December 31, 1980: 36-37. 
(a) Base Year 
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TABLE 6 
CITY INCOME TAX (in Millions) 
1971 - 1980 
YEAR 













1971 $ 15,436. (a) (a) 25 
1972 16,768. $ 1,332. 8.6 24 
1973 17,461. 693. 4.9 22 
1974 19,131. 1,670. 9.5 24 
1975 29,938. 10,807. 56.4 34 
1976 34,139. 4,201. 14.0 36 
1977 38,979. 4,840. 14.0 35 
1978 40,504. 1,525. 3.9 34 
1979 44,560. 4,056. 10.0 33 
1980 42,848. (1,712.) (3.8) 32 
(a) Base Year 
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Thus in 1975 the city income tax was able to yield over 94% more 
income than the 1971 total receipts and by 1978 had generated more 
than 152.5%. 
Conversely, the more traditional bulwark of local revenue, 
the gerneral property tax provided approximately 11% of the total 
revenues as the percentage rate decreased 50% between 1971-1980. 
Nevertheless, the combined income and property tax receipts 
generated an average 42% of total revenue over the 10 year period 
See Table 7. 
In the key area of intergovernmental assistance, several 
developments can be noted. The category Other Grants accounted 
for 19 to 25 percent of total revenue between 1971-1974. This 
figure declined noticeably to less than 5 percent in 1975, whereas 
the categories of general revenue sharing, community development 
block grants and comprehensive employment and training funds 
provided 10 to 21 percent of the city's income. Moreover, tfien 
state and local tax contributions are added, intergovernmental 
assistance accounted for over one-fourth of all available revenue 














MAJOR SOURCES OF BASIS OPERATING REVENUE (in Millions) 
PROPERTY TAX 








$ 10,902. $ 15,436. $ 26,338. 44 
10,592. 16,768. 27,360. 40 
10,602. 17,461. 28,063. 36 
10,478. 19,131. 29,609. 37 
10,534. 29,938. 40,472. 47 
10,599. 34,139. 44,738. 48 
10,449. 38,979. 49,428. 44 
10,683. 40,504. 51,187. 43 
11,319. 44,560. 55,879. 42 
11,587. 42,848. 54,435. 41 
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TABLE 8 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE YIELDED BY 















1980 $ 8,867. $ 23,801. $ 32,668. 25 
1979 10,269. $ 26,042. 36,311. 27 
1978 8,236. 24,886. 33,122. 28 
1977 8,379. 20,912. 29,291. 26 
1976 7,017. 12,416. 19,433. 21 
1975 6,164. 9,051. 15,215. 18 
1974 6,250. 22,030.** 28,280. 35 
1973 6,191. 25,217. 31,408. 40 
1972 5,607. 16,600. 22,207. 32 
1971 5,266. 11,593.*** 16,859. 28 
*General Revenue Sharing/Community Development Block/Grants 
Comprehensive Education and Training Grants. 
**General Revenue Sharing/Other Grants/Comprehensive Education 




What emerges from the preceding analysis is that the 
primary income growth in the public economy has taken place in 
funds solicited from secondary sources. On the other hand, the 
locus of operating revenue, general property taxes and flat-rate 
municipal income tax, experienced a general decline resulting from 
a shrinking of the private base. 
Secondly, the growth income was targeted funds designed for 
discrete policy issues, i.e., law enforcement, community 
development and employment training and education, that had 
recently been added onto the public agenda. However, an 
entreprenurial ethos permeates the city's culture and resonates in 
a public agenda which has historically depoliticized issues of 
resource allocations. Emergence of socio-economic needs 
precipitated by deindustralization caused a revision of the 
bureaucratic policy agenda by the chief administrative official, 
the city manager. Directly affected by this revisionism was the 
city's labor-management relations and the subsequent pattern of 
public employee participation. An inherent element defining the 
latter conditions was the development of a public policy which 
formally institutionalized the city's labor relations. 
CHAPTER III 
In this chapter, the legal framework for public unionism 
and collective bargaining in the City of Dayton is discussed and 
the city as a bargainng organization is described. 
A significant feature of labor relations in Ohio is the 
contradictory nature of the legal structure addressing this policy 
issue. State law, for example, statutorily prohibits employees' 
work stoppage under the Ferguson Act of 1947 without granting 
rights of organization and bargaining while Revised Code 9.41 
statute permits dues check-off for the purpose of maintaining 
union membership. As a result of the legislative vacuum in this 
area, case law has provided the basis for legitmizing collective 
bargaining rights for municipal employees. In the 1970 case of 
Foltz v. City of Dayton the court declared: 
Civil service employees of a city have the 
right to bargain collectively with the city 
respecting their wages, hours and conditions 
of their employment and have a right to 
designate a union to represent them in such 
bargaining. ’ 
A9 
Foltz v. City of Dayton. 272 N.E. 2 169, p. 173. 
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Case law has also facilitated the extension of bargaining rights 
by undermining the enforceability of the Ferguson Act. As 
provided by the latter, strikes by public employees are prohibited 
and includes termination among the penalties for such action. If 
rehire occurs there is a one-year compensation freeze and a 
two-year probation without tenure rights. However in 1971, the 
Ohio Supreme Court declared the Act could only be effected by 
providing notices to employees before penalties could be 
imposed. 
One consequence of this judicial posture was to effectively 
nullify the underlying intent of the Act, which was to thwart 
unionization and collective bargaining through the utilization of 
work stoppages, as employee organizations staged numerous job 
actions during the late 60's and early 70's designed to press for 
legislative reform at the state level or local enabling 
legislation to institutionalize labor relations. 
Within the time frame of this study (1969-1980) bills have 
been introduced in the state legislature to replace the Ferguson 
Act with comprehensive collective bargaining legislation allowing 
a limited right to strike. Such a bill was vetoed by the governor 
in 1975 and subsequent legislative efforts (which have ranged from 
50 
Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland 103 N.E., 512. 
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comprehensive coverage to a simple validation of collective 
bargaining agreements) have similarly been stymied due to the 
opposition of Ohio governors. 
Politics of Labor Policy Ordinances 
In February 1972 the Dayton City Commission promulgated 
"sweeping labor legislation" designed to structure its heretofore 
informal labor relations policy. The Commission's ordinances 
provided "A city version of the State's Ferguson Act prohibiting 
strikes by public employees;" empowered the City Commission to 
institute "mediation and binding arbitration, in the event of a 
contract dispute"; and eliminated from the bargaining units of 
uniformed public unions, all ranking officers in the police and 
fire departments.^ 
While all the employee organizations strongly objected to 
the laws related to the strike ban and impasse procedures, the 
public safety unions were particularly opposed to the ordinance 
requiring the elimination of some of its membership. Both unions 
had been working without contracts while negotiating with the city 
during this period and the major obstacle had been the request by 
the city to exclude what they considered to be supervisors from 
the bargaining units. 
Discerned from accounts of the event, passage of the 
controversial labor laws were designed to accomplish several 
^Journal Herald, February 17 , 1972. All subsequent 
quotations in this section are taken from this source. 
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things. First, the city manager asserted that the "ordinances 
would legalize collective bargaining which [had] been done through 
tacit appproval by city government since 1964." Secondly, the 
three laws were passed as "emergency ordinances" that permitted 
them to "become effective immediately." Since the new labor 
policy empowered the Commission to resolve impasses, the 
"stalemated contract talks with the Fraternal Order of Police 
(FOP)" could be submitted to the City Commission for resolution. 
The unions, on the other hand, viewed the ordinances as 
"repressive legislation." For example, the city's strike ban was 
perceived as redundant "since state law already prohibit(ed) 
strikes by public employees." Particularly offensive to the 
unions was the law's "$100 daily fine of workers on strike [as 
well as] a $250 fine on the strikers' union." The employee 
organizations also objected to the "powers granted the commission" 
in the event of an impasse. Under the new policy, "the first step 
in an impasse would have been to...a city commission fact-finding 
board." The board was to have three members, two of which would 
be appointed by the city commission. 
The most vexatious issue from the perspective of the public 
safety organizations was the supervisory question. In its 
simplist terms, exclusion of these personnel meant a loss in union 
membership: 72 of 407 for the FOP and 100 of 409 for the fire- 
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fighters. Moreover, the affected unions contend that the 
resolution of the supervisory issue through legislation "was an 
attempt to legislate what couldn't be won at the bargaining 
table. " 
Finally it was asserted that "Labor also objected to the 
method of passage" of the new labor policy. The city manager "had 
given the commission and employees only two days notice" that the 
legislation would be submitted for approval of the Commission. 
Thus, the ordinances were passed "without allowing labor input." 
Speaking for the public unions, Millard Rogers, Executive 
Secretary of the Dayton Building Trades, indicated "that labor 
could agree to some of the legislation but wanted a voice in the 
total package." 
A threatened work stoppage by city firefighters and the 
blanket refusal of all the unions "to obey the [promulgated] 
ordinances" led the city to agree "not to enforce the law if an 
ordinance agreeable to the employees organizations could be 
written." A City Hall-Labor Review committee was created to 
revise the original labor ordinances with a Common Pleas Judge 
acting as mediator. Implementation of the emergency labor 
legislation was postponed by the city and the three major unions 
(and their allies in industry) agreed not to initiate any job 
52 
actions for a thirty-day period. 
•^Dayton Daily News, March 3, 1972. 
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A compromise labor law was finally approved on April 12, 
1972 with a separate ordinance establishing the city's strike 
policy. While the new law included a definition of supervisors 
which ostensibly removed such employees from a bargaining unit, 
the "commissioners.. .agreed to a recommendation of the joint city 
hall-labor committee to negotiate and possibly arbitrate the 
questions." As a result, neither the firefighters or police 
... 53 
bargaining units lost members. 
Summary 
Although a more detailed analysis of Dayton's labor policy 
follows, several points about the legitimating process can be 
made. From all indications, the impetus for formulating the labor 
policy came from the city's public management. For example, a 
statement by the city manager suggested that the unions were 
resistant or reluctant to formalize labor/management interaction: 
"...the ordinances were intended to 'set a framework for honest 
collective bargaining at the local level... .There are many who do 
not believe [ this]....But collective bargaining is secure." 
Substantiating the case that the labor policy was management- 
initiated was the unions' charge that the proposal "...was an 
attempt to legislate what couldn't be won at the bargaining 
table...." They further contended that the city manager was 
53 
Journal Herald, April 13, 1972. 
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totally responsible for "...the controversial labor legislation 
...and[that] his stewardship of the city [had] failfed]." ^ 
By initiating the formalized structure, the city's public 
management ensured that the parameters of the "rules of the game" 
would be unilaterally established. Without participating in the 
formulation process the unions had no input "in the total package" 
and were left having a reactive posture toward three individual 
items and not the entire structure of the proposed collective 
bargaining policy. 
Further supporting the contention that management wanted to 
limit the input of unions is the manner in which the proposal was 
submitted to the Commission. Neither the commissioners nor 
employee organizations were given time to study the proposal 
before formal consideration and voting took place. One reason for 
the urgency was said to be the prospect of countervailing pressure 
from unions that would undermine commission action on the 
proposal. According to a member of the commission, the usual 
procedure of postponing a vote on controversial legislation could 
not be adhered to because "...if we waited...we probably couldn't 
have passed it. . ." The primary difficulty for the commission 
would have been the inability to "maintain its solid front if 
there were another week of organized - and disorganized - pressure 
from employees and their political allies in big labor. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
April 5, 1972. 
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In discussing the city's legislative efforts, one of the 
newspaper's editorials also pointed to the issue of "timeliness": 
And passage of the legislation at a time when 
negotiations are in progress serves to undercut 
the bargaining process. In fact, passage of 
all the ordinances at this time cannot but 
sour relations between the city and its 
employees. 
There may be no propitious moment for the 
passage of such sensitive, controversial 
legislation, but some moments are worse than 
others. And the present moment, we believe, 
was one of the worst possible. 
Finally, the controversial nature of the labor laws and the manner 
of passage appeared to be stimulated primarily by the behavior of 
public safety employees (firefighters and law enforcement) and not 
DPSU. Nevertheless, the city's approach to legally stabilizing 
its labor relations engendered a divisiveness which implicitly 
served to forestall an in depth review of the structual 
development of the city's labor policy. 
Dayton's Public Sector Labor Law^ 
Dayton's formalized policy is rather limited in the issues 
it covers. For example, Ordinance 24262 articulates the 
"^Ibid. February 18, 1982. 
^^An Ordinance "Amending Section 141 and 141-2 of the 
Code of General Ordinances Prohibiting Strikes Against the City of 
Dayton by Its Employees, and Declaring an Emergency." Code of 
General Ordinances 24260, April 12, 1972. An Ordinance "Amending 
Ordinance No. 24216 to Provide Orderly Procedures for the 
Administration of Employer-Employee Labor Relations, and Declaring 
an Emergency." City of Dayton Code of General Ordinances. 24262, 
April 12, 1972. 
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legitimacy of bargaining, outlines procedures for attaining 
exclusive representation, unit determination and certification and 
decertification of employee organizations. Ordinance 24260, on 
the other hand, is solely devoted to structuring the principles of 
a strike policy and impasse procedures. Each of the above areas 
will be briefly discussed. 
Recognition and Coverage 
Collective bargaining, and by inference, the right of employees to 
organize, is contained in a definition of negotiate: 
[This] means the mutual obligation of the City 
and the duly authorized representative[s] to 
negotiate in good faith in order to freely 
exchange informaton, opinions, and proposals 
and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters 
within the scope of representation. 
While the term negotiate is not explicitly defined, the indication 
that meetings between management and labor are a "mutual 
obligation" appears to confirm the requirement to bargain 
collectively as opposed to the "meet and confer" approach which 
places no obligation on management. 
Employee organizations like DPSU that had previously been 
recognized by the City as exclusive representatives did not need 
to obtain certification through election procedures. However, the 
Ordinance indicated that: 
Any employee organization...certified.. .as the 
representative of a majority of the 
employees...in an appropriate representation 
unit..shall be awarded the exclusive right to 
represent the...unit for a reasonable period 
of time (in no case less than 2 years). 
c g 
J Ordinance 24262, op. cit. 
59 Ibid. 
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The ordinance gives to the Director of Personnel and the 
City Manager responsibility for determining what types of 
employees and occupations comprise the appropriate unit for 
representational purposes. Decisions of these official can be 
challenged and reviewed by an independent arbitrator appointed by 
the American Arbitration Association under its applicable rules 
and whose decision is considered final and conclusive. This 
language regarding third party intervention in unit determination 
emerged from a compromise reached at the time the ordinance was 
passed. 
The usual exclusions from union representation are 
identified, i.e., managers, professionals, classified employees, 
and supervisors. The last category had been one of the major 
obstacles in the original ordinance submitted by the city's 
management. According to the ordinance, a supervisory employee 
was distinguished by the responsibilities: 
...to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, 
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or 
discipline employees or responsibility to 
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or 
effectively to recommend such action... 
This minute detail regarding supervisors was designed to prohibit 
public safety unions from incorporating into the bargaining unit 
individuals with the above characteristics. 
Strike Policy and Impasse Procedures 
An examination of Dayton's public labor history reveals 
only two work stoppages. In 1966, DPSU proposed that the 
agreement between the parties take the form of binding written 
contracts. Following the rejection of this proposal by the city, 
60 Ordinance 24262, op. cit. 
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DPSU staged the first major work stoppage involving Ohio public 
employees. The strike was led primarily by DPSU members in the 
city's Parks, Recreation, Sanitation, and Water-Sewage 
Departments. However, the city's entire direct service workforce 
cooperated in the work stoppage and halted governmental operations 
for two days. As a result, the city agreed to engage in 
collective bargaining with all its public unions with subsequent 
agreements taking the form of a binding written contract.^ 
The Ferguson Act established the criteria for defining a 
strike (prohibited under any circumstances), employees behavior 
which would characterize a strike, established termination as the 
primary sanction for engaging in strikes, and explicated the 
conditions and procedures under which reinstatement was to be 
considered. 
Following this legislated state policy, Dayton's public 
management promulgated its strike policy. The Ordinance defined a 
strike as: 
...failure to report for duty, the willful 
absence from one's position, the stoppage of 
work, or the absence in whole or in part from 
the full, faithful, and proper performance of 
duties of employment, for the purpose of 
inducing, influencing, or coercing a change in 
the conditions, compensation, rights, 
priviledges or obligations of employment or of 
intimidating, coercing, or unlawfully 
influencing others from remaining in or from 
assuming such public employment. 
The information regarding the 1966 strike was 
provided by Mel Scott, International Area Director, AFSCME-AFL- 
CIO, in an interview on April 28, 1981, Centerville, Ohio. Scott 
was President of DPSU during the 1966 strike. The second work 
stoppage was a three day strike in August 1977 by the city's 
firefighters, IAFF Local 136. As reported in the Government 
Employee Relations Report, the issues prompting this strike were 
wages and hours of work. GERR 721:18 August 15, 1977. 
62 
Ordinance 24260, op. cit. 
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The applicable sanction for a striking employee was notification 
by the Director of Personnel or the City Manager "...that he is on 
strike and is suspended without pay." Following such 
notification, the striking employee can utilize delineated 
procedures for securing reinstatement and is extended the right to 
appeal to the Civil Service Board. Monetary fines could be 
assessed against the employee organization, but were not to be 
more than $250.00 for each violation. 
With the elimination of the strike as a legitimate tactic, 
Dayton has followed the general trend of relying on third party 
intervention for impasse resolution. Implementation of impasse 
procedures occurs when the bargaining process reaches what the 
ordinance defines as an impasse: 
[This] means the failure of the parties to an 
existing agreement to achieve agreement thirty 
(30) days prior to the expiration date 
thereof, or the failure of the City and an 
Employee Organization to reach agreement on an 
initial agreement within ninety (90) days 
after negotiations have commenced. 
The first step in the process is mediation. Either party 
may initiate a request for the services of a mediator to be 
obtained from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. If 
the mediator's report indicates a continuing impasse following 
such discussions, the second step, factfinding, is implemented. 
63 
Ordinance 24262, op. cit. All subsequent quotes in 
this section are taken from this source. 
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Under factfinding each party is permitted to "...appoint a 
member to a factfinding Board." The third member is then selected 
by the appointed two members and ostensibly represents the public. 
If the third member cannot be "promptly" selected, the ordinance 
authorizes the use of procedures established by the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service for this purpose. Unlike the 
mediation process, the ordinance stipulates an explicit time-frame 
for this process. If the impasse "...remains unresolved for 
forty-five (45) days following the submission of the Board's 
findings and recommendations..." the City Commission has the 
authority to render a majority vote decision on the factfinding 
Board's report. Such a decision becomes final unless either party 
submits a "...written protest...within ten (10) days..." With 
such a protest, advisory arbitration, the final step of impasse 
resolution is invoked. 
Advisory arbitration differs from the previously described 
conventional arbitration in that the final award cannot be imposed 
on the parties, making it non-binding. In order for advisory 
arbitration to become binding, agreement must be reached between 
the "...employee organization and...a majority of the Commission 
[that] all or any part of such arbitration may be authorized as 
final and binding on the parties..." 
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Impact on Governmental Structure 
The City Manager is given the administrative responsibility 
for "promulgat[ing] appropriate rules and regulations to 
implement..." the ordinances.^ Therefore the ordinance does 
not create a separate administrative unit to implement the labor 
policy. According to Levine and Hagburg, "Unit determination is 
established by some form of employee relations board in eight 
cities... The authors give several specific examples of 
municipalities where independent or neutral agency is authorized 
by local ordinance. For example, Chapter 54 of the New York City 
Charter establishes the Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB). 
This is "...an impartial public employee labor relations agency 
authorized to determine questions of union representation and to 
administer dispute settlement procedures..." The San Francisco 
ordinance creates a three-member Municipal Employees Relations 
Panel (MERP) . The ordinances of the City and County of Los 
Angeles provide for "...boards of neutral labor relations experts 
to administer the ordinances in such areas as...unfair employee 
relations practices." The Phoenix, Arizona case is particularly 
instructive because Arizona has no state public sector bargaining 
statute. However, the city's 1975 ordinance, which covers 7500 
employees, authorizes a "...three member Public Employee Relations 
Board which will conduct representation election and investigate 
complaints of bad faith bargaining." 
^ Marvin J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagburg, Public Sector 
Labor Relations, (West Publishing Company: St. PauT^ 1979 ) , pp. 
113-115. All subsequent quotes in this section are taken from 
this source. 
-73- 
The sole structual modification in Dayton was the creation 
of a labor relations division which is a component of the 
Department of Personnel.^ The division has a three member 
professional staff which includes a labor relations manager (LRM), 
who is also the division chief, labor relations supervisor (LRS) 
and a labor relations specialist. On "normal day-to-day 
activities," the labor relations manager reports to the Personnel 
Director. However, during periods of contract negotiation, 
preparation and actual bargaining, the Division personnel are 
directly responsible to the City Manager. 
The LRM and LRS divide the responsibility for negotiating 
with the city's six bargaining units. For example, the LRM 
negotiates contracts with AFSCME's DPSU, the Fraternal Order of 
Police, and the International Association of Fire Fighters. The 
LRS handles contract negotiations with the city's clerical unit, 
also represented by DPSU, Dayton Building and Construction Trade 
Council which represents skilled-trade workers, plumbers and 
electricians, and Local 20 Operating Engineers which represents 
pumping station operators in the Water Department. 
During the collective bargaining process, negotiators from 
the labor relations division are the chief spokesperson for the 
city and have autonomous decision-making authority. This ability 
to exercise decision-making authority is a result of a city 
^The following information regarding the Labor 
Relations Division was provided by Thomas Payne, Director of Labor 
Relations in an interview on October 10, 1980, Dayton, Ohio. 
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process which precedes the negotiation of a new contract. 
Included in this preparatory "briefing session," are the City 
Commission, the City Manager, the Personnel Director, and the 
Labor Relations Manager. The three administrative personnel 
officials make "recommendations on what bargaining limits... should 
[be] established" for the specific bargaining units scheduled for 
negotiations. Following the City Commission's approval of these 
recommended limits, the city negotiators "don't have to go back 
for anything within those parameters. The only thing that [needs 
to be done] is [to] keep the Manager advised as to what's going 
on; what directions things are taking." If, however, an impasse 
should occur and agreement appears unlikely within the established 
parameters, the city's spokesperson "have to go back to the 
Manager and the Commission for review [and] perhaps even 
re-thinking as to whether those parameters are proper." 
The above structual arrangements and procedures have 
distinct implications for Dayton's bargaining process. First, the 
regularized "briefing sessions" between elected officials and 
public managers project the appearance of internal cohesion among 
city management prior to contract negotiations. Complementing 
this is an internal structural arrangement which delegates 
decision-making responsibility to a single management negotiating 
department. Consequently, the problem of fragmentation of 
authority for personnel matters is resolved and this reduces the 
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opportunities for a union to "play one interest against the other" 
in order to gain leverage at the bargaining table. 
Nevertheless, Kochan and Wheeler suggest that a delegation 
of authority as exists in Dayton can become an advantage for a 
public union: 
...if sufficient power is concentrated in the 
hands of a single management official who has 
the authorty to make a broad range of issues, 
more of these can be incorporated into the 
bargaining agreement. Secondly, management 
negotiators who are delegated such a broad 
degree of power are likely to be more 
experienced labor relations professionals. 
Although... they may not be more favorably 
disposed toward union wage demands, 
experienced negotiators might be more likely 
to accept the legitimacy and the value of 
negotiating a comprehensive labor 
agreement. 
Dayton's labor relations division reflects this type of profes¬ 
sionalism. Staff members include a lawyer and two holders of 
Masters of Public Administration degrees. While members of the 
staff have generally obtained on-the-job labor relations 
experience, additional training is provided through conferences 
and seminars designed for public administrators of labor 
relations. Arising from this professional orientation is the 
anticipated "attitudinal" commitment to collective bargaining 
captured in this observation by Labor Relations Manager Payne: 
Thomas A. Kochan and Hoyt N. Wheeler, "Municipal 
Collective Bargaining: A Model and Analysis of Bargaining 
Outcomes," in Public Sector Labor Relations Analysis and Readings. 
David Lewin, Peter Feuille, and Thomas A. Kochan eds. (Glen Ridge, 
New Jersey: Thomas Horton & Daughters, 1977), p. 369. 
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...It's a cliche in this business that 
bargaining is here to stay until something 
better comes along...In this day and age, 
particularly, there has to be a mechanism 
in place which permits employees to realize 
that they have an effective way of managing 
their own destinies. They must feel that 
they have the where-withal and ability to 
influence their own day-to-day activities 
....In the absence of bargaining you would 
lose that...[and] there would have to be 
another mechanism put in place to achieve 
that. ® 
From an observation by former union president, Mel Scott, DPSU did 
benefit from this "professionalism." According to Scott, 
following the passage of the ordinance, the relationship between 
the parties was amicable. Management consulted the union 
informally about any policy that would affect the working 
conditions of DPSU employees. They were allowed to have input 
about prospective managerial appointees. Although Scott did not 
specifically mention whether the professionalism of the labor 
relations staff was an advantage during negotiations, the 
researcher was left with the general impression that Scott viewed 
69 all aspects of the bargaining relationship positively. 
Summary 
As the theory and critical analysis of collective 
bargaining suggested, the formalization of labor relations in 
Dayton appeared to be a response to employee militancy that had 
been accelerating throughout the late 1960's. However, the 
theoretical analysis also suggested that the affirmation of the 
^Payne interview, op. ci t. 
69Scott interview, op. ci t. 
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legitimacy of employee collective action and concomitant 
structural accomodations provides a pretext for reconstituting 
management's control of the employment relationship. And the 
labor policy established by the Dayton ordinances (along with the 
politics surrounding their passage) illustrate how this 
"mobilization of bias" is asserted. 
For example, the stated intention of Dayton's labor law had 
a dual purpose: "...Provide Orderly Procedures for the 
Administration of Employer-Employee Labor Relations and Declaring 
an Emergency."^0 However, the actual outcome is a policy 
skewed toward maintaining labor peace through coercion. Since 
punitive sanctions are incurred for work stoppages, impasse 
procedures become mandatory remedies for breakdowns in 
negotiations. 
On the other hand, "...Procedures for Administration 
of...labor relations," etc. primarily covers aspects of the 
bargaining process that had evolved during the informal period of 
labor relations. Omitted from the policy are references to unfair 
labor practices which are proscriptions related to the duty to 
bargain and applicable to both union and management.^ And 
left unclarified is the scope of bargaining, i.e., the range of 
legally permissable subjects about which the parties may 
negotiate. For example, the category is referred to as "the scope 
^Ordinance 24262, op. cit. 
^Under the previously cited Phoenix, Arizona case, 
Levine and Hagburg cite the following proscriptions covered by the 
ordinance: "Management unfair labor practices include 
discrimination for union activity, domination of unions, and 
retaliation against employees for invoking their rights under the 
(continued) 
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of representation," in a definition of "negotiate," and again in 
connection with the definition of an employee organization: 
'Employee Organization' means any organization 
in which employees participate and which 
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, 
of dealing with the City in matters concerning 
wages, fringe bepgfts or working conditions 
(emphasis added).' ^ 
One consequence of the latter is that the City's bargaining 
process is frequently concerned with clarifying the specific areas 
that are eligible for bilateral discussion. According to Payne: 
...It's a matter of interpretation by the 
parties and what it has done is created an 
opportunity for impasse. It's so vague that 
when a bargaining unit comes in and says we 
want to negotiate residence and we say now 
wait a minute, we've never had a contract 
provision on residency... They say that's a 
working condition. They point to the 
ordinance and say yes it is negotiable and we 
say no it's not. And so what happens is we 
have to go to fact-finding or arbitration. 
In sum, the only discernible difference between the 
promulgated labor policy and the previous informal period of labor 
relations is the articulated procedural requirement for submitting 
disputes to a third party review. Since this type of intervention 
serves to forestall work stoppages it becomes the basic method for 
(Continued) 
ordinance. Unions are forbidden to cause the city to discriminate 
againt an employee, to threaten employees who exercise their 
rights, to coerce employers into union recognition, to force 
management to meet and confer with unauthorized employee 
organizations, to force assignment of work to a particular union 
or craft, and to engage in unnecessary make-work practices." op. 
cit. p. 115. 
72 
Ordinance 24262, op. cit. 
73 
Payne interview, op. cit. 
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deflecting employee militancy into a manageable institutionalized 
form, one of the implicit control functions identified in the 
critical analysis. 
CHAPTER IV 
The theory of collective bargaining posits two basic points. 
Employees, through their representatives, will pursue the bargaining 
goals of increased wages, an equitable standard of treatment, extension 
of basic security and welfare benefits (also known as fringe benefits) 
and the establishment of a contractual juridical mechanism for contesting 
management actions. Management, on the other hand, will be concerned 
with ensuring that extensive managerial discretion is maintained. To 
determine if the labor agreements executed between Dayton Public Service 
Union (hereafter referred to as DPSU) and the City of Dayton conform to 
these expectations, the contracts were examined to ascertain what issues 
were negotiated, the actual content of these contractual provisions, and 
the pattern, if any, in the issues negotiated. 
The subsequent discussion of these outcomes is considerably aided 
by a case study of Syracuse, New York conducted by Richard H. Korn.73 
In this excellent study, Korn operationalizes a model of municipal bar¬ 
gaining outcomes that features a qualitative contract analysis that 
facilitates comparisons across political jurisdictions. 
73Richard Henry Korn, "Municipal Collective Bargaining: A 
Longitudinal Study of the Determinants of Bargaining Outcomes and the 
Impact on Local Government in Syracuse, New York." Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation Cornell University, 1979. 
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In following the pioneer theoretical work of Kochan and Wheeler, Korn 
analyzes bargaining outcomes along economic and non-econoraic dimensions. 
Economic outcomes that can be expected to be found are: 
...compensation; time off with pay; insurance and 
pensions; hours of work and overtime pay; and a 
miscellaneous category labeled 'other economic 
outcomes'...74 
The non-economic items are divided into three general areas: institu¬ 
tional security for the union, management rights, and employee protection. 
The latter items are operationalized to be: 
...grievance, arbitration, and discipline proce¬ 
dures; employment security and seniority; job 
classification; and a miscellaneous category 
labeled 'other employee protection outcomes'...7-* 
Institutional security is used to refer to any provision in an agreement 
that relates to time-off for union business, dues check-off, or any other 
arrangement that acts to legitimate the union and its officials. No oper¬ 
ational definition of management rights is offered, but it is assumed that 
since bargaining outcomes place limitations on management decisionmaking, 
there must be some demarcation of those areas where management retains 
unilateral control. 
Utilizing this framework, the initial discussion in this chapter 
concerns the bargaining outcome found in the contracts resulting from the 
six periods of contract negotiations between DPSU and the City of Dayton. 
The second part of the chapter will present an evaluative analysis of a 
survey questionnaire administered to the rank and file. 
74Ibid. p. 101 
75 Ibid. p. 101 
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Discussion of Findings^ 
Table 9 lists all of the outcomes arising from the DPSU/Dayton 
experience. As this shows, the scope of bargaining outcomes encompasses 
a range of topics that tend to address matters related to union activities 
and institutional guarantees, fringe benefits, employee protections, em¬ 
ployment policies and practices and compensation. Thus DPSU's agreements 
reflect all of the structural characteristics delineated in the theory of 
collective bargaining presented in Chapter I. The majority of the provi¬ 
sions are "rules specifying management action or limiting it," with the 
requisite grievance procedure to challenge violations of these rules. A 
broadly worded management rights clause is complimented by arbitral review 
that is "limited to interpretation and application of the terms of the 
agreement,” and the prohibition on strikes that is covered in Ordinance 
24262 is reiterated. The latter are significant outcomes for management 
in that these provisions delimit the degree of employee and union partici¬ 
pation in the workplace through collective bargaining. 
Economic Outcomes 
Compensation: In 1971, DPSU and the City of Dayton signed their first 
two-year agreement. The contract provided employees an approximately 31^ 
increase in hourly wages. For those working second and third shifts, the 
contract provided shift differentials of 111 and 13fé. 
1972-1973: Job rate increases ranged from 35<5 to 37^ per hour over the 
two year contract period. Increases effective in 1974 were 20jé per hour. 
'■‘■Unless otherwise indicated, all the material referencing 
negotiated outcomes is taken from DPSU Local #101 and the City of 
Dayton contracts for 1969-1979. It should also be noted that the 
subsequent discussion is primarily a descriptive analysis because 
of the paucity of data concerning the on-going bargaining outcomes. 
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TABLE 9 
OUTCOMES OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
DAYTON PUBLIC SERVICE UNION AND THE CITY OF DAYTON 
1969 - 1981 
A. Benefits for the Bargaining Agent 
Dues deduction 
Released time for union activities with pay 
Use of city equipment 
Use of free office space 
Use of city communication system 
(bulletin boards, mail service, telephones) 
Representation rights for union officials 
B. Employee Protection 
Right to retain present benefits under the law 
Right to have union representation at discipline/ 
grievance proceedings 
C. Management Special Interest Items 





Working out of classification 
Disciplinary actions 
E. Monetary Benefits Other Than Salary 
Health insurance 
Life insurance 
Pay for accumulated unused sick leave 
Leave provisions (without loss of pay) 
personal leave death leave 
leave for family illness sick leave 
maternity leave military leave 
F. Wages and Salary Provisions 
Maximum and minimum range 
Salary increments for longevity 
Cost-of-living adjustments 
G. Grievance Procedure 
Definition of grievance 





Data on shift differential for this period were not available. 
1975-1977: Effective March 1975, job rates were increased to approximate¬ 
ly 63^ per hour. Then in March 1976, these rates were increased by an 
additional 28** per hour. Shift differentials increased to 14«* and 16*5 in 
1975 and reached 15j* and 18** by the end of the contract in 1977. 
Beginning with this contract, longevity service pay was authoriz¬ 
ed. Employees with 5 to 10 years of continuous service received $25.00 
annually. Employees with 10 or more years service were entitled to a 
cash payment of $75.00 annually. 
1977-1979: Job rates were increased 15<* per hour for both steps. These 
rates were increased to 25** per hour in 1978. Shift differentials were 
raised l£ each over the previous rate to 16** and 19** per hour. 
1979-1981: Effective April 1979, job rates were increased to 89<* per hour 
for step 3 and 94«* per hour for step 6. Then in April 1980, step 3 rates 
rose another 40** per hour and 44^ per hour for step 6. While there was no 
change in the rate of second shift differential, third shift rates in¬ 
creased to 20<*. 
Time Off With Pay;77 Employees are granted 11 holidays. Vacation leave 
is earned at the rate of one day for each month of service. This is 
supplemented by the accrual of additional days based on length of service. 
A maximum of thirty (30) days vacation can be taken during the year with a 
maximum retention of thirty (30) vacation credits allowed which can be 
carried from year to year. Any denial of vacation leave due to exigencies 
^The contract language for this item was initially negotiated in 
1969 and did not change in subsequent contracts. 
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of city manpower requirements which cannot be rescheduled during the year 
results in a cash reimbursement at the beginning of the next calendar 
year. The agreements grant two (2) personal leave days per calendar year 
and three (3) days of paid leave for death of family members. 
The number of sick leave days earned per year is approximately fif¬ 
teen (15) days. Employees are entitled to accumulate a maximum of one 
hundred forty (140) days during their tenure of employment. Specific pur¬ 
poses for which sick leave is granted include personal illness, illness of 
a family member, maternity reasons, or in the event of community enforced 
quarantine. There is a limit of three days per occurrence which can be 
authorized by management officials below the City Manager. 
Excess sick leave credits are converted into vacation days accord¬ 
ing to established Personnel Policy on vacation leave. A cash payment for 
unused accumulated leave is made to an employee at the time of retirement 
or an employee's beneficiary, in the event of the death of the employee. 
Health and Life Insurance: The health insurance plan is non-contributory 
for the employee and includes dependent coverage for ages 19-25. Manage¬ 
ment also pays full premium cost of life and accident policy. As Table 10 
illustrates, coverage for both types of insurance changed during the 
period under study. 
Hours of Work and Overtime Pay:78 The majority of the employees covered 
by the agreement are compensated for a forty (40) hour work week consist¬ 
ing of eight (8) consecutive hours per day, five (5) consecutive days per 
^DPSU Local No. 101 and the City of Dayton contracts 1969-1980. 
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week, Monday through Friday. The contracts indicate exceptions for "...a 
continuous twenty-four (24) hours per day operation or where there is a 
continuous seven (7) day a week operation made necessary because of the 
nature of the work." 
The question of overtime compensation was modified during the ten 
years of bargaining. From 1969-1975, employees were entitled to receive 
time and a half ojr compensatory time for all hours over eight (8) worked 
on any day or for all hours worked over forty (40) in any one work week. 
The type of compensation received was determined by a Personnel Instruc¬ 
tion. However, with the 1975-1977 agreement, reference to procedures 
authorizing compensatory time were deleted. 
All agreements authorized compensation for temporarily performing 
work in a higher job classification, called Plus Rating. Standby pay for 
continuous availability during weekends for emergencies or repair work 
required that employees receive four (4) hours pay for 24 hours standby 
and eight (8) hours pay for being available 48 hours. Call-in pay for 
work performed when an employee was recalled to work beyond the normal 
work day was compensated at time and one-half for all hours worked. In 
each of the above instances, the rate of compensation was made according 
to a referenced Personnel policy. 
Miscellaneous Economic Outcomes: The contracts all provided a reimburse¬ 
ment system for meals. Beginning with $1.50 in 1969, allowances for this 
purpose reached $2.50 by 1979. Added in the 1977-1979 contract was an 
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TABLE 10 
HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE PROFILE 
1969-1970 1971-1973 1973-1975 1975-1977 1977-1979 1979-1981 
100% for 
employee 














































Life Ins- Life Ins. Life Ins. Life Ins. Life Ins . Life Ins. 
$4,000 (1969) 
5,000 (1970) 









$3,000 $3,000 $3,000 
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authorization for rest periods. This agreement, and all others following 
it, also found the employer obligated to furnish uniforms for employees 
in the following areas and classifications: 
...Divisions of Street Maintenance and Sewer 
Maintenance Division of parks employees in classi¬ 
fications of Park Handyman, Equipment Operator I, 
II, and III, and Laborer...[EJmployees in the 
classifications of Painter I, Painter II, Traffic 
Control Painter I, Traffic Control Mechanic I, 
Golf Handyman, Welder, Corrections Maintenance 
Man, Pipeman I and II, Water Meter Installer I 
and II, and Water Meter Repairman... 
Non-Economic Outcomes 
Except for the initial contract, explicated items related to per¬ 
sonnel policies and practice have remained the same. These include the 
subjects: reduction-in-force; recall; shift exchange; class specifications 
classification transfers; working out of classifications; and promotions. 
The contractual language covering these topics reiterates previous 
ly established procedures or general policy statements found either in 
Personnel Instructions or Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Four of 
the subjects are related to the general area of position classification. 
The Union has access to information (classification and specifi¬ 
cation manuals) used to design position content and qualification require¬ 
ments and any subsequent changes the City effects. If the latter results 
in a new classification, the City is obligated to "...furnish the Union a 
copy of the class specification and rate of pay..." In both instances of 
new job establishment or "permanent and substantial changes" to existing 
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job content, the Union can challenge the "rate of pay assigned to the 
class" through the grievance procedure. 
Under the provision Plus Rating, conditions and time restraints 
are delineated for working employees out of their classification (i.e. 
performing job duties of another, usually higher, job classification) when 
management must meet "requirements of productions due to temporary absence 
of an employee." Similarly, the Classification Transfers clause delineates 
management's authority to utilize, on a temporary basis "...employees from 
one classification to another classification of equal or lower pay rate 
within the same division..." The clause also identifies when the principle 
of seniority must be evoked and Civil Service Rules followed. Finally, 
employees are permitted the right, in a Transfers provision "...to exercise 
his/her job classification seniority to transfer to available vacant posi¬ 
tions..." within certain limited parameters, and with supervisory approval, 
can exchange or trade shifts between themselves. 
A detailed approach is accorded the issues of reduction-in-force 
(RIF) and recall. Articulated in the Lay Offs provision are the two con¬ 
ditions for which RIF's may be instituted, "...lack of work or funds or 
...subcontracting..." and the procedure to be followed. 
The key principle guiding the RIF procedures is seniority which 
is defined as "...length of continuous service with the City." Whenever 
the above conditions predicate a RIF, a sequential process begins with 
"probationary, temporary, part-time and seasonal employees..." being 
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removed from city payrolls. Then permanent and temporary employees cover¬ 
ed by the City's classification service are subject to removal according 
to classification seniority in those positions affected. Should no vacan¬ 
cies be available in which the latter employees can be placed, the tradi¬ 
tional alternative derived from the seniority principle, commonly known 
as "bumping" is authorized. 
The latter procedure is critical for the majority of DPSU bar¬ 
gaining unit members in that there are minimal qualification standards for 
the unskilled jobs comprising the "labor class" positions. Thus virtually 
all non-labor class employess qualify for labor class positions, conse¬ 
quently this is the classification category of "last resort" for all non- 
uniform city employees and warrants a separate contractual displacement 
and layoff procedure. 
Management Rights: All the negotiated contracts contain a management 
rights clause. The clause appearing in the Dayton contracts conforms to 
the commonly used short form. In 1969, the clause was drafted to state:- 
Nothing contained in this Agreement shall alter 
the authority conferred by Law, Ordinance, 
Resolution or Civil Service Rules and Regulations, 
upon any city official or to in any way abridge or 
reduce such authority. 
Moreover, it was acknowledged that city officials had an obligation to 
enforce the negotiated agreement, but such implementation was to conform 
with the established law. However, in subsequent agreements, this lan¬ 
guage was modified. As described in 1979, the clause declared: 
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...the City of Dayton reserves and retains solely 
and exclusively all of its rights of authority... 
[particularly regarding] the direction of its 
affairs and working forces [as authorized by] the 
Charter of the City of Dayton, Ohio. 
Yet, it was acknowledged that actions of management were subject to re¬ 
straint where "...expressly modified by a specified provision..." of the 
negotiated agreement. Thus, except for the initial agreement, Dayton's 
managerial authority to act unilaterally was, in principle, curtailed in 
certain areas as a result of bargaining. 
The nature of these restraints is illustrated in two areas sub¬ 
contracting of work and "past practices." In 1975 a provision affirming 
management's right to subcontract appeared. Without defining the terms 
or specifying the conditions under which such action may occur, the clause 
indicates : 
No subcontracting of work presently performed by 
Union members and which would result in the dis¬ 
placement of employees from their classification 
will be undertaken by the Management without first 
meeting and conferring with the Union thirty (30) 
days prior to any such subcontracting to discuss 
the subcontracting and its effects. 
Several policy statements established a "contractual priority" vis-a-vis 
extant personnel rules and regulations. For example, the 1969 agreement 
states : 
Those portions of the sections of the Personnel 
Instructions specifically referred to in this 
Agreement and which are applicable to the 
employees covered by this Agreement are hereby 
incorporated by reference into this Agreement and 
made a part thereof. 
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This policy was subsequently reinforced by two provisions in 1975 which 
precluded both the appplication of and alterations to personnel policies 
which "...conflict with any provisions of [an] agreement..." 
Finally, although a separate ordinance was formulated and approved 
prohibiting strikes, each contract contained a no-strike provision. 
Lacking the specificity of the Ordinance, the clause reiterated the pro¬ 
hibition against any job actions by employees that may be interpreted as 
a "strike." At the same time, the provision vitiates a management lockout 
against eraployess desiring to perform regularly assigned duties. 
Institutional Security for the Union 
Basic union representational rights and other institutional guar¬ 
antees were gradually authorized under bargaining. A provision providing 
for voluntary dues deduction appeared in the contracts beginning in 1969. 
Employees were required to certify in writing that monthly allotments of 
dues should be deducted for at least one year, with automatic renewal for 
a similar length of time, unless written revocation is given to the City 
and Union. Since the entire process outlined in the contracts was autho¬ 
rized by Section 9.41 of the Revised Code of Ohio, the City's obligation 
to provide this service could be terminated if the State ever declared 
such action illegal. 
Such a judicial determination voided a key institutional item nego¬ 
tiated in the initial contract. According to the 1969-1970 union security 
article, employees were required to "...either join the Union...or pay a 
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monthly service charge to the Union in an amount equal to the Union's 
regular monthly dues..." This combination union shop/maintenance of mem¬ 
bership carried a contractual obligation for the City to "discipline" a 
bargaining unit employee for "failure to pay such contract administration 
chargefsJ.” The possible disciplinary actions ranged from a one-day sus¬ 
pension for each month in arrears up to discharge from employment. This 
very stringent, prounion clause was challenged legally as an intrusion 
on employee rights’ to freely choose to participate or decline to parti¬ 
cipate in a private organization as well as an unlawful condition of 
employment imposed upon the employees by the City. Consequently, begin¬ 
ning with the 1971 contract there was no mention of union security 
issues.79 
Sharing in the representational responsibilities are the Chief 
Steward and Staff Representative. The latter is a functionary of the Area 
District Council, of which DPSU is a member, and replaced the previously 
key union official variously described as Business Agent and Business 
Representative. The 1969 contract accorded this official the following 
rights : 
The Staff Representative may consult with employees 
in the assembly area before the start of and at the 
completion of the day's work and he/she shall be 
permitted access to work areas at all reasonable 
times only for the purpose of adjusting grievances, 
assisting in the settlement of disputes and for the 
purpose of carrying into effect the provisions and 
aims of the Agreement... This privilege is extended 
subject to the understanding that work assignments 
are not, in fact, interfered with. 
79 Foltz v City of Dayton. 272 N.E. 2d 169, p. 171. 
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The contracts are silent regarding the explicit functions of the 
chairperson/vice chairperson except to note that in the absence of steward 
representation or a staff representative, these officials would be enti¬ 
tled to exercise the former's privileges. However appreciable development 
is evident in the role of the local president. 
For example, prior to 1973, the contract permitted the president 
(and vice president) of the local to exercise only those privileges 
granted to the business representative and stewards when the latter 
officials were unavailable. Then in 1973 a supplemental agreement was 
reached which revised the Union president's role in the labor relations 
process. The main change was in making the president the primary point 
of contact with public managers on contract administration matters. 
Accordingly, the agreement provided: 
Whenever problems arise with regard to the inter¬ 
pretation and administration of the agreement 
between the Dayton Public Service Union and the 
City, and such problems are at the division level 
or higher, the Union President shall be contacted 
to participate in the resolution of such problems 
or difficulties. 
Paid release time for union activities became a contractual right 
in 1973. A total of thirty (30) days leave with pay was granted to the 
union officials to "...attend Union functions such as conventions, educa¬ 
tional meetings, State convocations, or other high-level Union business." 
It was further stipulated that the Union remaining time divided among 
other bargaining unit employees and union members. 
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The use of certain official facilities and services did not appear 
in the contracts until 1973. Use of bulletin boards for posting union- 
related literature was also obtained in 1973 although the city retained 
the right to approve material selected for display. And the 1973-1975 
agreement also authorized various office equipment primarily for the Union 
president: 
The Union President shall (where feasible) have 
available to him the use of desk space, filing 
space in a drawer file or cabinet, and access to 
a telephone so that he may function effectively. 
Union representational rights are authorized by all the contracts. 
Outlined under Union business are the duties and responsibilities of five 
levels of union officials: stewards, chief steward, staff representative, 
chapter chairperson/vice chairperson, and the local president. As is 
customary, stewards have primary responsibility for representing employees 
during grievance procedures, thus the contracts stipulate that "stewards 
involved will be permitted reasonable time to investigate and process 
grievances..." This narrowly construed organizational role was bolstered 
by a prohibition against any other type of union activity: 
Union business, other than that listed above, 
shall not be conducted by Union stewards on City 
time, nor shall it in fact interfere with the work 
assignment of the steward involved or the City 
work assignment of other employees. 
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Employee Protection 
Grievance, Arbitration and Discipline Procedures: The dispute 
resolution policy, which has been consistent since 1969, is complete in 
that the contractual language specifies that scope of the procedure, 
procedural steps, processing time allowed and method of final dispute 
settlement. Although the basic procedural structure has remained 
constant, some changes have occurred in this key item. 
The scope of the grievance procedure, that is the type of issues 
that can be challenged by employees and the union, is broadly defined. 
For example, the procedure is designated as the method for resolving 
complaints concerning the application, interpretation, and enforcement of 
the agreement. Moreover, the contracts expressly note that 
...any controversy or difference...[that arises] 
with respect to the...rights, obligations or 
liabilities... [of the parties] shall be handled 
as [outlined in the contract]. 
Thus, any matter emanating from the application of personnel 
practices or regulations which are not included in the agreement but are 
incorporated into it by reference, can become a grievable matter. 
Procedural Steps in the Grievance Mechanism: The contractual 
language stipulates when to file a grievance, when to appeal, and when a 
grievance can be submitted to arbitration. Furthermore, the provisions 
stipulate the consequences of failing to appeal or respond to a grievance 
by indicating time-frame requirements. For example, management's failure 
to act on the grievance within the time allowed between steps results in 
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the grievance progressing to the next level of decision-making. Should 
the grievant fail to act within the time allowed between the steps, the 
grievance is considered abandoned or resolved on the basis of the last 
decision rendered. While the overall procedural arrangements have 
remained basically the same, a closer examination of the changes that have 
occurred finds that the modifications tended to remove ambiguous contrac¬ 
tual language related to the requisite behavior of the parties and de¬ 
limited the role of neutral third party decisionmakers. 
Generally, grievance procedures provide for an informal meeting 
which consists of a discussion between the employee affected (with or 
without a union steward) and the first line supervisor. This meeting is 
designed to precipitate a resolution of any problems at the site of the 
conflict while involving those most familiar with the working environment. 
In Dayton, this type of oral discussion was initially negotiated in 1969 
as a part of the first step of the formal process. 
An employee or group of employees that have perceived a violation 
of certain contract provisions are directed to reduce the grievance to 
writing and present it to the first line supervisor outside the bargaining 
unit. Since this constitutes a formal meeting between an employee and 
management, union representation is a prerequisite. Consequently, the 
contract provides that the "...Union Steward and/or Business Representa¬ 
tive must accompany the grievant when the grievance is submitted." 
Regarding the question of timeliness, the 1969 agreement stated that an 
-98- 
aggrieved employee would present the grievance "...as soon as possible 
after the employee becomes aware of the alleged...” problem. 
The responsibility for responding to the grievance was with the 
first line supervisor and had to be given to the grievant "...by the end 
of the shift on the day after it has been presented..." Finally, in order 
to pursue the complaint at the second step, it became the responsibility 
of the aggrieved employee to refer the complaint "...within five (5) days 
after receipt..." of the supervisor's decision. 
The deciding official at the second step had four days to reply 
in writing to the grievant and union representative. Failure to do so 
permitted the union to automatically elevate the grievance to the Director 
of the Department. The grievance could also be referred to the latter 
official within five days of the receipt of the manager's response. 
At the third step of the procedure, two management officials out¬ 
side the bargaining union chain of supervision became involved: the 
Department Director and Personnel Administrator. It was the former 
manager's responsibility to conduct an investigation of the complaint and 
present the findings at a grievance meeting. Management and union were 
permitted no more than four representatives at the meeting and each group 
had the right to present witnesses to help in the investigation and 
explication of the complaint. The Department Director's written reply 
had to be given within seven (7) days of receipt of the grievance and 
attendant correspondence. 
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If the grieving party remained unsatisfied, a "written notice of 
intent to file..." for arbitration had to be received by the Personnel 
Administrator within ten (10) days after receipt of the reply. 
The fourth and last step of the procedure as negotiated in 1969 
was the arbitration process. Following the submission of the required 
notice, management and the union had ten (10) days to request, by joint 
letter, nominations of a arbitrator from the Federal Mediation and Con¬ 
ciliation Service. Both parties had to agree upon an arbitrator to hear 
the case at a date which was amenable to "...the wishes of Management, 
the Union, availability of the arbitrator." It was stated that "A... 
decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon all parties 
participating..." and that costs were to be shared equally by management 
and union for the arbitration proceedings. 
When the same item is examined in the 1979-1981 contract, several 
modifications can be noted. For example, the 1979 contract expanded the 
time frame allowed for internal resolution prior to arbitration from 
thirty-five (35) days to sixty-three (63) days. Secondly, the Union 
steward was explicitly designated as the union representative authorized 
to participate in the initial stages of the grievance procedure. One 
consequence of the expanded time frame was the provision for two separate 
grievance meetings. An investigation of the complaint and discussions of 
the results are undertaken at the department level and, failing resolution 
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there, by the Personnel Division. In each instance, the required parti¬ 
cipation of management and union was specified. 
A third procedural change was also effected regarding arbitration. 
Not only was it more explicit in outlining the participants and purpose 
of the process, but also the manner in which an impartial arbitrator was 
to be selected: 
If no agreement is reached at [the arbitration 
meeting between management and labor], a joint 
letter requesting Federal Mediation and Concilia¬ 
tion Service to submit the names of five (5) 
arbitrators will be signed and mailed. Upon 
receipt of such names, the Union and Management 
shall alternately cross off one name until one 
name remains, that person being selected as the 
arbitrator. 
This differs significantly from the initial ambiguity related to this 
selection process whereby "Upon receipt of such nominations, Management 
and Union shall agree upon an arbitrator to hear the case." 
A fourth notable addition, mentioned in two separate paragraphs, 
is the prohibition against precedents being established as a result of 
prearbitration and/or timeliness settlements: 
Pre-arbitration grievance settlements shall not 
necessarily establish a precedent for future 
relationships between the Union and Management. 
In the case of failing to maintain timeliness 
...where a decision of the appropriate Management 
representative is not given...within the time limits 
specified or within the period. . .extended by mutual 
agreement, the grievance, without setting a prece¬ 
dent for future grievances, shall be considered 
satisfactorily resolved in favor of the grievant. 
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The 1979 agreement also established a category that permits the presenta¬ 
tion of a policy grievance. This is a formal complaint "...which if 
resolved in favor of the Union, applies to all employees equally." Among 
the implications of such a provision are that the Union could extend the 
literal provisions of the contract or challenge the validity of actions 
presumed legitimate by virtue of "residual management rights." 
Perhaps the most significant additional clause appearing in 1979 
is related to the jurisdictional scope of arbitrators. The express pur¬ 
pose of this clause is to vitiate the ability of an arbitrator to decide 
issues outside the scope of the written agreement when called upon to 
review, reverse, or modify a management action: 
The arbitrator shall neither add to nor subtract 
from nor modify the language of this Agreement in 
arriving at a determination of any issue presented 
that is proper for arbitration within the limita¬ 
tions expressed herein. The arbitrator shall 
expressly confine himself/herself to the precise 
issues submitted for arbitration and shall have no 
authority to determine any other issues not so 
submitted to him/her or to submit observations or 
declarations of opinion which are not directly 
essential in reaching the determination. 
Discipline and Discharge 
With respect to discipline and discharge, all contracts have 
provisions addressing some aspect of this issue. Typically, discipline 
in unionized settings must adhere to contractual due process. Within this 
context, due process refers to procedural regularities that management 
must follow when administering employee discipline. Accordingly, labor 
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agreements usually indicate three basic procedural steps to be followed 
in effecting discipline: 
The discipline process will follow certain time 
limits specified in the labor agreement, 
The employee will be entitled to union represent¬ 
ation when discipline is being administered, 
The employee will be notified of the specific 
offense in writing. 
The study disclosed that contractual language contained provi¬ 
sions reflecting these general principles. For example, in the initial 
agreement it was stipulated that a supervisor who meets with an employee 
and there is a reasonable likelihood that "...disciplinary action of 
record (written reprimand, suspension or dismissal)..." will take place, 
there was an obligation to provide an employee a "...written notice...of 
the employee's right to have a steward present..." at the meeting. 
Following 1971, the process of implementing discipline is clearly 
specified. Disciplinary action must be initiated within thirty (30) days 
once a supervisor was aware of an infraction. Penalties that could be 
applied for infractions included suspension, reduction-in-rank and dis¬ 
missal. However, before initiating any of these actions, the City (in 
this case the Personnel Department) was required to "...deliver or mail a 
copy of the Charges and Specifications to the Regional Director of the 
Union..." The letter must identify "...the alleged violations and set the 
time and place for a hearing before the Department Director or his/her 
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designated representative..." The time limitations for notifying the 
union of the required hearing is five (5) work days. 
Three provisions outline the appeal process available to 
employees. For purposes of contesting any adverse action, an employee 
must elect to file an appeal either to the Civil Service Board or 
utilize the negotiated grievance and arbitration procedures. Written 
notification of the preferred appeal process must be submitted to the 
Civil Service Board within ten (10) calendar days from the effective date 
of the adverse action. By choosing the negotiated grievance procedure, 
an employee waives any administrative or judicial appeal rights. If an 
employee initiates an appeal through both the grievance process and the 
Civil Service, the contract provides that the administrative procedures 
are automatically invoked. Finally, any record of a sustained discipli¬ 
nary action must be removed from an employee's records "...two (2) years 
from date of issue..." and could not influence any future disciplinary 
decisions that might occur. 
It is appropriate at this point to summarize the major changes 
negotiated in the 1971-1979 agreements. The 1969-1970 agreement is not 
discussed since it was the parties' first agreement. In the contract 
covering the 1971-1972 period, with respect to the noneconomic outcomes 
of bargaining, the addition of provisions that encompass bumping, recall, 
and transfer procedures and the judicially rescinded union security clause 
are the most important changes. With respect to the economic outcomes, 
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the most significant changes were in the area of wages. For example, 
average hourly wages increased approximately 31^. 
In the contract covering the years 1973-1975, the most notable 
changes were the inclusion of provisions related to institutional 
security. In terms of the economic outcomes, average hourly wage in¬ 
creases were low to moderate: 35 to 37 cents per hour. 
The 1975-1977 contract brought about a number of significant 
changes in the economic area. There was a substantial increase in 
average hourly wages - approximately for the two year period. A 
longevity pay provision and clothing allowance were also added. In the 
fringe benefit area, hospitalization and medical coverage was increased 
to 356 days while life insurance premiums were raised and coverage for 
accidents was added. With respect to non-econoraic outcomes, the addition 
of a management's right to subcontract was an important modification. 
For the remaining two contract periods, 1977-1979 and 1979-1981, 
the only changes to occur were in the economic area of wages. In the 
1977-1979 contract there was a low to moderate increase that provided 40^ 
per hour while the average hourly wage increased to 89£ per hour for step 
3 and 94<5 per hour for step 6. Then in April 1980, another 40^ and 44 
respectively, was added to the hourly wage. 
Based upon the foregoing descriptive analysis, the initial writ¬ 
ten contract negotiated by DPSU was essentially concerned with two funda¬ 
mental matters. Two things are meant by this characterization. First, 
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the scope of bargaining encompasses a standard range of topics that tend 
to address matters primarily related to compensation, fringe benefits, 
and employee protections. Secondly, except for the area of wages and 
portions of the negotiated grievance procedure, a majority of these 
initial provisions tend to replicate extant local, state or federal laws 
and ordinances. This finding supports Feller's proposition that 
generally the initial collective bargaining agreement contains little 
more than rules governing employer conduct that correspond to existing 
employer policy or practice. 
Thus the contract outcomes are not products of joint decision¬ 
making presumed to inhere in the negotiation process. And while the 
additional provisions appearing in subsequent contracts exhibit a dis¬ 
cernable pattern, the focus remained within the parameters established in 
the initial agreement. The static nature of the contracts is related to 
the origin in state or local law of a majority of the provisions and the 
concomitant contractual requirement that the negotiated agreement has to 
conform with established law. This reiteration of extant law means that 
only the procedural processes of the issues are a subject for and product 
of bilateral determination. Thus, the three areas in which bilateral 
determination occurs on a substantative as well as procedural level are 
institutional guarantees for the union, the negotiated grievance 
procedure and wages. 
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The institutional guarantees provide the union legitimacy as the 
exclusive representative of the employees and the authorization to 
perform its representational responsibilities. Before examining the 
effect of the negotiated grievance procedure developed in the Dayton 
case, it is instructive to note that a major concern pervading the liter¬ 
ature on public bargaining is that civil service rules and regulations, 
if not, the entire merit principle is circumvented, undermined, or made 
obsolete with the institution of contractual appeal procedures. 
In a presentation of generalizations based upon field work for a 
Brookings Institute study, Burton suggested that collective bargaining 
was incompatible with the "...use of the merit principle..." in that this 
principle would be either eliminated, forced to become management advo¬ 
cates in areas of personnel management under its jurisdiction, thereby 
ending its illusion of "neutrality" or have its jurisdiction limited to 
issues such as recruiting" 
Stanley, on the other hand, argues that the definition of the 
"merit system" or "civil service" is crucial to the evaluative process. 
If the terras used describe the underlying principle of standaridized 
criteria developed for selection placement and the competitive process to 
determine these practices, then collective bargaining has had minimal 
impact. However, if a terra such as "civil service" is used in the dis¬ 
cussion, then this refers to a broad range of functions usually asso¬ 
ciated with a comprehensive personnel system. This encompasses respon- 
^Ojohn F. Burton, Jr., "Local Government Bargaining and 
Management Structure," p. 109 in Public Sector Labor Relations. 
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sibility for recruitment and placement; position management (i.e., job 
classification and performance evaluation); training and development; 
and an administrative appeals process for resolution of adverse actions 
(i.e., discipline, grievances, and layoffs). Under this rubric, collec¬ 
tive bargaining outcomes have resulted in some changes. 
Similarly, Lewin argues that "The thesis that the growth of 
collective bargaining in government presages the demise of civil service 
systems seems overdrawn." Based upon his case study of Los Angeles 
governments, he proposed that unions attempted to "...reduce the scope 
of issues over which civil service commissions...exercise exclusive 
control." Accordingly, he found that "...organized public employees 
evidenced strong concern only about the personnel issues such as classi¬ 
fication, promotion, and discipline, but little if any interest in the 
others, for example, recruitment, selection, and hiring.”^ 
This supports a theoretical argument advanced by Lewin and Horton 
that conceptual confusion causes the a priori declaration of the demise 
of meritocracy: 
The primary conflict is not, as most have assumed 
between collective bargaining and merit; instead, 
the true source of conflict is between the per¬ 
ceived interests of organized public employees 
and government managers... Generally speaking, 
organized public workers seek to limit managerial 
discretion over the terms and conditions of employ¬ 
ment; generally speaking, managers seek to maintain 
or extend their discretion in these spheres. 
^-'-David T. Stanley, op cit p. 117. 
^David Lewin, "Public Sector Labor Relations: A Review 
Essay," Labor History (Winter 1977), p. 211. 
83üavid Lewin and Raymond D. Horton, "The Impact of 
Collective Bargaining on the Merit System in Government," p. 417 
in Public Sector Labor Relations. 
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Consequently, depending on the goals of the parties, bargaining may 
either strengthen or weaken merit rules. 
Finally, Wellington and Winter assert that workers in the public 
sector seek to negotiate over a broad range of employmentrelated issues, 
endeavoring in the process to "control" so-called management rights. 
Levine and Hagburg, for example, report studies in the federal sector 
show this broad scope approach results in: 
A predominance of requirements that management 
consult with the union on assignment and schedul¬ 
ing work, although management retains the ultimate 
authority to make decisions; requirements that 
management give the union notice in connection 
with overtime, changes in work hours; changes in 
shifts and tours of duty, and transfers and tem¬ 
porary assignments; wide use of seniority and a 
rotation pattern as decisive factors in determining 
work loads and assignment after all other valid 
factors are considered...^ 
The evidence of this study suggest that only certain facets of 
the management authority/civil service interface are affected by bar¬ 
gaining. In the DPSU case, the area of responsibility for the Dayton 
Civil Service Commission is the promulgation and enforcement of rules to 
implement the municipal merit system. This includes authority for 
position management (classification and standardizing of positions); 
recruitment and placement (appointments, promotions, transfers, and 
examinations); and an administrative adjudicative process for appeals of 
adverse actions (removals, layoffs, suspensions, demotions and 
reinstatements).^5 
^Marvine J. Levine and Eugene C. Hagberg, Public Sector 
Labor Relations. (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1979), p. 32. 
^^Hagerman, Director of Finance, etc., v. City of Dayton, etal. 
71 NE 2d, p. 247. 
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The classified service is comprised of "the competitive class and 
the unskilled labor class.” The former group must successfully complete 
competitive examinations and be certified by the commission prior to 
being selected. Unskilled laborers have less stringent qualification 
requirements (i.e., no mention of competitive examinations) and are 
"...placed on the eligible list for the kind of labor or employment sought 
and preference [is] given in employment in accordance with the rating 
received from such evidence or in such tests..." Dayton follows the 
"rule-of-one" practice established by Section 10 of Article 15 of the Ohio 
Constitution and requires that "...the commission shall certify to the 
appointing authority only the name of the person having the highest 
rating."86 
Civil service law establishes parameters for adverse action 
resulting from violations of standards of conduct. For example, suspen¬ 
sion without pay for disciplinary purposes can be effected "...for a 
reasonable period, not exceeding thirty days." However, the employee 
receiving a suspension, lay-off, or reduction (presumably in grade) is 
entitled to a written notice delineating the reasons for the action, and 
a "reasonable time" to respond (i.e., "make and file an explanation). 
Nothing is said regarding the entitlement to representation under these 
circumstances.87 
In the DPSU contracts the scope of the grievance procedure is 
broadly defined to include "...the application of personnel practices or 
^^Op.cit., pp. 254, 256. 
87 Op.cit., p. 256. 
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regulations ...incorporated into the agreement' by reference...,” there¬ 
fore presumably any civil service procedure can become a grievable matter. 
The agreements, nevertheless specifically stipulate that rates of pay 
assigned to new or changed position classes can be challenged through the 
negotiated grievance process. And, next to employee protection, this is 
the only area covered by civil service rules and regulations that is 
explicitly addressed in the contracts. 
The contractual due process advanced for instances of disciplinary 
and discharge action reflects basic principles (and in some instances) 
procedures of extant civil service policy. One significant difference is 
the espousal of employee entitlement to union representation when disci¬ 
pline is "reasonably" anticipated. And, as mentioned above, all the 
contracts following 1971 require that the Personnel Director notify the 
Union in writing and institute a hearing within five (5) work days before 
any final disciplinary action is taken. 
All the agreements provide optional appeal processes of adverse 
actions. An employee has to elect to use either the negotiated grievance 
procedures or the Civil Service Board processes. Moreover, should there 
be an attempt to utilize both approaches, the administrative appeals 
process is automatically invoked. Thus, while the contracts allow for 
the above choice when appealing management decisions related to adverse 
action, the broad scope of the negotiated grievance procedure permits any 
item covered by the agreement to be challenged. 
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Analysis of Wage Outcomes 
Although there is no consensus in the area of measurable factors 
of a city's ability to pay the overall costs of collective bargaining 
settlements, it is presumed that improvements in the city's ability to 
pay will be reflected in higher settlements, particulaly with respect to 
increases in wages. Conversely, reductions in the factors contributing 
to the city’s ability to pay will be reflected in lower settlements. A 
countervailing concern that the union brings to the bargaining table is 
the maintenance of their members' standard of living. Thus changes in 
the cost-of-living, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) are a 
key factor when evaluating whether this goal is achieved. 
Methodology of Wage Outcome Analysis 
With respect to the base wage outcomes, an analysis could have 
been made by determining the cost of the total wage package for each 
round of bargaining or by determining the average wage increase for unit 
members. Percentage increases could then be determined from this data. 
However, the data needed for these approaches are not readily available. 
These approaches require knowledge of the number of employees in each job 
classification, the number of employees at each level within the classi¬ 
fication. Thus the approach used in this study is a modification of 
Korn's methodology for analyzing changes in base wage outcomes based on 
benchmark jobs. 
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As explained by Korn 
...under the benchmark job framework, a represent¬ 
ative job (or jobs) [is] chosen and the analysis 
of salary/ wages outcomes revolves around these 
jobs. The choice [is] determined by using two 
criteria” 1) a significant proportion of the 
employees in the bargaining unit work in the 
benchmark job (or jobs); or, in the event that 
this criterion cannot be met, 2) the job chosen 
represents the average wage in the unit (when 
this is known) or the jobs chosen reflect the 
range of jobs included in the bargaining unit.88 
According to the City Personnel Director David Stinson, DPSU has 
represented approximately 500-800 of the city's employees throughout the 
period under study. The bargaining unit includes employees working in a 
variety of job classifications.8^ A 1977 Affirmative Action Plan^® 
indicates that the Public Works and Water Department accounted for 580 
employees that worked in the service/raaintenance and skilled craft areas. 
See Table 11. At least five grade levels contain a significant propor¬ 
tion of the job classifications for these two categories: Grades 115, 
116, 117, 118 and 119. Based upon longevity data supplied by the 
Personnel Director, the highest concentration of employees are in the 
middle (Step 3) and top (Step 6) ranges of the salary scale. Thus the 
choice of a representative sample of grade and step levels to be used as 
benchmarks in the analysis outcomes consist of grades 115, 116, 117, 118 
and 119 at Steps 3 and 6. 
88Korn, p. 181 
88A complete list of the job classifications included in 
the DPSU bargaining unit can be found in the Study's Appendix. 
90Affirmative Action Plan 1977-1981, Office of the City 
Manager, Dayton, Ohio. 
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• TABLE 11 
STATISTICAL PROFILE OF DPSU LOCAL 101 
BARGAINING UNIT 






PUBLIC WORKS AND 
WATER DEPARTMENT 
260 27.9 1- 5 162 
238 25.6 6-10 149 
128 13.8 11-15 80 
101 10.9 16-20 63 
122 13.0 21-2 5 75 
82 8.8 26-30 51 
931 580 
As outlined in Chapter II, Dayton's basic sources of revenue 
during this period has been the property tax and municipal income tax. 
Thus, these are the two economic variables assumed to be the most signi¬ 
ficant in assessing the city's ability to pay bargaining settlements. 
Table 12 provides data on each of these factors for the 1971-1980 period. 
In addition, Table 13 presents Estimated Percentage Increases in Average 
Hourly Wages for the same period. 
It can be seen from Table 12 that except for 1980, revenue 
received by the City as a result of combined property and income taxes 
increased every year, although there were noticeable fluctations in the 
rate of increases. In 1972, there was a 3.9% increase in property and 
income tax revenue received by the City. The average hourly wages for 
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DPSU members rose approximately 7 percent. Between 1973 and 1975, there 
was a combined increase of 6.1% in property and income tax revenue. This 
was matched by another average hourly wage increase for DPSU workers of 
approximately 7%. There was a 47.2% increase in the City's revenue from 
this source for the 1975-1977 period. The contract negotiated by DPSU 
during this same time resulted in a noticeable increase of 12.4% hourly 
wages in 1975 and approximately 5% in 1976. 
Between 1977 and 1979, property and income tax revenue rose by 
6.9%. The contract negotiation saw a moderate increase in the average 
hourly wage with an across-the-board $.40 rate. Finally, between the 
1979-1980 period, tax revenues received by the City were decreased by 
6.6%. The 1979-1980 increases of approximately 21% secured by DPSU was 
the highest received during the 1971-1980 period. Thus, it appears that 
there is a minimal correlation between the changes in property and income 
tax revenues generated by the City and the pattern found in the average 
hourly wage outcomes. 
Consumer Price Index: From 1971 to 1980, the Consumer Price Index iir- 
creased by 116.6%. It can be seen from Table 13 that the increases in 
average hourly wages for DPSU during the entire 1971-1980 period reached 
approximately 80%. From 1972 to 1980, the CPI increased by 109.9%. The 
1973-1980 increases in average hourly wages for the benchmark jobs reach¬ 
ed 59%. From 1973 to 1980, the CPI increased by 98%. The 1974-1980 




1971 - 1980 
ABILITY TO PAY 
YEAR 
TOTAL PROPERTY 








($ in millions) 
1971 $26,338 - 120.8 - 
1972 27,360 3.9 124.7 3.3 
1973 28,063 2.6 132.4 6.2 
1974 29,609 5.5 146.7 10.8 
1975 40,472 36.7 164.7 12.3 
1976 44,738 10.5 174.5 6.0 
1977 49,428 10.5 186.7 7.0 
1978 51,187 3.6 207.5 11.14 
1979 55,879 9.2 235.6 13.54 
1980 54,435 (2.6) 261.7 11.08 
*Source: "Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers," Monthly Labor Review 1972-1981 
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marked disparities between the rate of inflation and average hourly wages 
obtained in negotiations starts to narrow after 1975. 
TABLE 13 
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES 
1971 - 1980 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 19; 
STEP __ _ 6.9 3.6 4.6 12.4 5.1 2.8 4.6 15.5 6.1 
THREE (3.90) (4.17) (4.32) (4.52) (5.08) (5.34) (5.49) (5.74) (6.63) (7.i 
STEP 7.0 3.6 4.1 12.4 4.9 2.5 4.1 14.7 6.< 
SIX (4.39) (4.70) (4.87) (5.07) (5.70) (5.98) (6.13) (6.38) (7.32) (7. 
AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE CHANGES PERCENTAGE CHANGES 
1971- 1973- 1975- 1977- 1973- 1975- 1977 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1975 1977 1979 
STEP 
THREE 
42/hr 76/hr 41/hr 1.14/hr 80 46 1.78 
STEP 
SIX 
48/hr 83/hr 43/hr 1.19/hr 73 48 1.77 
For example, from 1975 to 1980, the CPI increased by 59% while 
average hourly wage rates reached 38%. From 1977 to 1980 the CPI in- 
creased by 40%. The 1977 to 1980 increases in average hourly wages were 
27%. From 1978 to 1980 the CPI registered at 26% while the average hour¬ 
ly wage increase was 23%. Although it is not directly comparable, it is 
instructive to note the average hourly wages for similar occupations of 
workers in communications, electric, gas and sanitary services in 
Dayton's private sector. For example, during the entire 1971-1980 period, 
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increases in average hourly wages for these groups reached 1.03%. In the 
1973-1980 period, increases reached 74.2%. The 1974-1980 increases in 
average hourly wages were 61.0%. For the period 1975 to 1980, average 
hourly wage rates reached 49.1%. In the 1977-1980 period the wage 
increases were 24.9%; then 16.6% in 1978-1980. 
Thus it appears that neither public nor private sector workers 
were able to offset the erosion of their standard of living brought about 
by inflation. However, the data indicates that after 1975, unit employees 
represented by DPSU were receiving higher average hourly wage increases 
than workers engaged in similar occupations in the private sector.^ 
Looking closer at the CPI, Table 12 indicates that increases in 
the Index for the 1971-1980 period ranged from a low of 3.3% in 1972 to a 
high of 13.5% in 1979. It was advanced earlier that changes in the CPI 
are a key factor in wage outcomes because unions are concerned to mediate 
the effects rising prices have on their members' standard of living. This 
being the case, one would expect a year of rapid inflation to be followed 
by relatively higher settlements in base wages. The corollary is that a 
year in which the CPI increase was lew should be followed by relatively 
lower settlements in base wages. The DPSU case tended to support this 
proposition. 
For example, the CPI increase in 1972 was only 3.3%. The two year 
contract negotiated for the 1973-1975 period ranked among the lowest, in 
terms of wage settlement increases, secured by DPSU - 3.6% in 1973 and 
^■'■Employment, Hours, and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-82, 
Volume 11: New Hamp shir e-Wyoming, (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, January 1984), p. 674. 
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4.1% in 1974. In 1978, the CPI increase was 11.14%. The resultant 
increases that became effective in the 1979 contract were the highest 
obtained by DPSU. The average hourly wage rose by 15.5% in 1979 with an 
additional 6% increase in 1980 - a total increase of 21.5% for the two 
year period. 
In sum, the issues that comprise the scope of bargaining between 
DPSU and the City of Dayton fell into the discernable patterns of com¬ 
pensation, employee protection/security and institutional security for 
unions. Such findings appear to support the off-stated proposition that 
collective bargaining contracts effected by unions representing non- 
uniform and noneducational employees tend to focus upon traditional 
areas of economism and delimitation of managerial authority through a 
broadly defined grievance procedure. 
Having said this, more specific observations can be made. With 
respect to the issue of wages, the evidence supports the expected primacy 
of this item in the contracts. Despite the predictability of this focus 
Lewin suggests "...the relative ability of public employee unions to 
secure relative wage gains is more limited than is popularly supposed...” 
This wage outcome "...is roughly on the order of five per cent..."^ 
Looking at the level of base wages over time with at least one 
measure of the general economic environment, the CPI Table 12 shows some 
support for the latter argument. The increases in base wages obtained by 
DPSU were seldom able to offset the excessively high rate of inflation 
9^David Lewin, "Public Sector Labor Relations: A Review Essay," 
in Public Sector Labor Relations Analysis and Readings. David Lewin, 
Peter Feuille, and Thomas A. Kochan eds. (Thomas Horton & Daughters, 
1977), p. 374. 
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pervading the city's economic environment. As the Estimated Percentage 
Increase in Average Hourly Wages demonstrated, annual increases for the 
DPSU benchmark positions noticeably fluctuated, particularly for the 
first year of the contract. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence in the DPSU case to indicate that 
changes in the CPI for a particular year had some effect on wage settle¬ 
ments. For example, when the CPI was 3.3% DPSU negotiated its lowest wage 
settlement of 3.6%, whereas its highest wage increase, 15.5%, was secured 
when the CPI was 11.14%. 
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Survey Data Analysis 
The previous section examined bargaining outcomes as reflected in 
the negotiated contract agreements. However, this cannot address the 
issue of how the rank and file view the city's labor relations policy and 
practice. Therefore the following analysis will examine the attitudes 
and opinions of unionized public employees represented by DPSU Local 101. 
The survey had two objectives - 1) the development of a socio¬ 
economic profile of the rank and file and 2) an analysis of their 
opinions and attitudes toward the city's labor policy. Ideally, such an 
analysis can lead to generalizations about the support among the rank and 
file for unionization and collective bargaining. In the case under 
study, data analysis would permit the advancement of generalizations 
about the 'efficacy' of an established labor-management program which has 
experienced changes in policy. 
Before preceding with the data analysis, a note about methodology. 
The questionnaire that was developed relied heavily upon a similar 
instrument used by Yancy in a study of Atlanta, Georgia's public relations 
policy.^ In that study, Yancy focused on evaluating the perceptions of 
the rank and file toward seven (7) general issues. Five (5) were viewed 
as being useful as organizing principles for the present study. 
1. What is the nature of the relationship which 
exists between the rank and file and the city? 
2. What are the opinions of the rank and file 
regarding the city's labor relations machinery? 
^Dorothy Cowser Yancy, "The Spectre of Public Unionism From 
1966 to 1976. A Critical Analysis of the Labor Policies of the City 
of Atlanta." Unpublished Ph.D. Dessertation, Atlanta University, 1978. 
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3. What are the views of the rank and file toward 
the city's position on collective bargaining? 
4. What are the sentiments of the unionized 
employees toward striking against the city? 
5. What is the level of support for labor unity 
among the unionized employees? 
Additional items were then developed for the questionnaire used in the 
study. 
1. What are the opinions of the rank and file 
regarding union representation? 
2. At what level were most grievances settled? 
3. What are the opinions of the rank and file 
regarding issues likely to cause grievances? 
Cross tabulations were established between all independent vari¬ 
ables and all dependent variables. An assumption was made based upon 
what Babbie terms "face validity"^ logic that a relationship existed 
between various dependent variables. For comparative purposes, five 
independent variables were identified as being useful in the analysis of 
a single population. The following independent variables were drawn 
from the socio-economic data generated by the questionnaire: 
Salary 




9^Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods, (Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), p. 256. 
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Based upon information provided by Robert Kessler of DPSU and 
David Stenson, Dayton Personnel Director, DPSU represents approximately 
900 city employees. The researcher sent a letter to Thomas S. Ritchie, 
President of DPSU, requesting permission to survey the rank-and-file. A 
request was also made for a list of the names and addresses of unit 
employees in order to administer the survey. During subsequent telephone 
conversations, Ritchie informed the reseacher that a mailing list of unit 
employees would not be provided. However, he did indicate that the union 
would cooperate in the distribution of the survey. Approximately 850 
survey instruments were mailed to DPSU for distribution to the rank-and- 
file. The survey package included a cover letter from DPSU Local 
President Thomas S. Ritchie, a letter of instruction, a four page 
questionnaire, a one page answer sheet and a stamped self-addressed 
return envelope. A follow-up letter was sent to Ritchie within a month 
of the initial bulk mailing. A second mailing to the rank-and-file was 
not undertaken since the researcher was unable to control the distri¬ 
bution of the survey. The fact that a third party administered the 
survey instrument is acknowledged as a major methodological shortcoming 
that places limitations on the study. For example, Babbie maintains that 
in a mail survey "...a response rate of at least 50 percent is adequate 
for analysis and reporting.Because the researcher had to depend on 
a third party, the entire rank and file (850) were sent questionnaires in 
an attempt to obtain a representative sample, thus 425 responses would 
^Babbie, op.cit. , p. 165 
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have been necessary to meet the standard of adequacy proposed by Babbie. 
The total number of responses received was 78. This is a 9 percent rate 
of return which is insufficient to produce the representative sample 
needed for a "robust analysis." While this places a limitation on the 
validity of the study's findings, the survey does provide general infor¬ 
mation about the composition of the rank-and-file and their perceptions 
and opinions that were previously non-existent. 
Profile of DPSU, Local 101 
Because of the low response to the survey, generalizations about 
the entire Local 101 constituency cannot be advanced. However, using the 
data as an indicator, the following profile emerged. 
Local 101 appears to be comprised of moderately young to middle 
aged white men. 
GENDER ETHNICITY AGE 
Women Men Black White 18-34 35-51 52-69 
32.1 60 24.4 70.5 42.3 42.3 11.5 
(25) (50) (19) (55) (33) (33) ( 9) 
Base: 7 8 respondents 
A high percentage of unionized emloyees (89.7%) are registered 
voters, as 70 of the 78 respondents answered yes when asked if they were 
registered voters. 
Ninety percent of Local 101's constituency are full-time city 
employees. However, 78.2% have been employed by the city for less than 
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fifteen years. Moreover, of this percentage, approximately 44.9% joined 
the city after 1978. 
LENGTH OF CITY EMPLOYMENT AND UNION MEMBERSHIP 
0- 6 7-13 14-20 21-27 










Length of DPSU 









The salary levels of the respondents indicates that the majority 
of unionized employees represented by DPSU earn between $10,000-$21,000. 
SALARY LENGTH OF DPSU MEMBERSHIP 
10-15k 16-20k 21-25k 0 -6 7-13 14-20 21-27 
15.4 64.1 17.9 44.9 33.3 14.1 3.8 
(12) (50) (14) (35) (26) (11) (3) 
The first issue area was 'What is the nature of the relationship 
which exists between the rank and file and the city?” Four variables 
we re used to discern the opinions and attitudes of the respondents to the 
above issue : 
V9 The city would treat you the same if you 
were not a member of DPSU. 
V18 I support the grievance procedure found in 
the bargaining agreements that DPSU has 
negotiated with the city. 
V5 The collective bargaining agreements nego¬ 
tiated between the city and DPSU improves 
working conditions. 
V8 The union stewards are concerned about how 



















Women (25) 52.0% 36.0% 68.0% 56.0% 
Men (50) 34.0 52.0 0.0 64.0 
Ethnicity 
Black (19) 21.1 42.1 57.9 31.6 
White (55) 43.7 47.3 63.6 70.9 
Age 
18-34 (33) 42.5 54.6 60.6 60.6 
35-51 (33) 36.3 36.4 57.6 63.7 
52-69 ( 9) 33.3 55.5 88.9 55.6 
Salary 
10-15k (12) 33.0 50.0 66.7 58.3 
16-20k (50) 44.0 44.0 60.0 60.0 
21-25k (14) 28.6 57.2 71.5 71.5 
Length of DPSU 
Membership 
0- 6 (35) 42.8 51.7 65.7 62.9 
7-13 (26) 38.5 50.0 53.8 61.5 
14-20 (11) 36.4 36.4 72.6 72.8 
21-27 ( 3) 33.3 33.3 100.0 33.3 
The figures in parenthesis represent the total number of respondents. 
Generally across each independent variable there was uniform 
response to each dependent variable; however, there was some distinct 
difference. Among women and men, 52.0 percent of the women believed that 
the city would treat them the same if they were not a member of DPSU while 
34.0 percent of the men agreed with this proposition. Of the white 
respondents, 43.7 percent agreed compared with 21.1 percent of Blacks. 
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With respect to the independent variables of age, salary and length of 
membership there was generally uniform response between 33.3 percent and 
44.0 percent. 
With respect to the proposition that collective bargaining agree¬ 
ments negotiated between the city and DPSU improves working conditions, 
33.3 percent of those with 21-27 years of membership agreed compared to 
62.9 percent, 61.5 percent and 72.8 percent of those with 1-6 years, 7-13 
years and 14-20 years, respectively. In terms of racial respondents, 
31.6 percent of Blacks indicated they agreed compared with 70.9 percent 
of Whites. 
With respect to support for the grievance procedure, it is signi¬ 
ficant that no men indicated agreement with the proposition while 68.0 
percent of the women agreed. Among the other independent variables, the 
range of agreement was 53.8 percent to 100.0 percent. With respect to 
the dependent variable, "The union stewards are concerned with how super¬ 
visors assign work," 36.0 percent of the women agreed compared to 52.0 
percent of the men. Black and White respondents had similar levels of 
support as 42.1 percent of the former agreed compared to 47.3 percent of 
the latter. Within the age grouping, 36.4 percent of those 35-51 agreed 
compared with 54.6 percent and 55.5 percent of those 18-34 and those over 
52, respectively. Among the independent variables of salary and length of 
service, those earning 16-20K and those having over 14 years of service 
appeared less supportive of this proposition. 
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Summary 
Despite the above noted variances within various independent 
variables, the rank and file appears to have a less than positive opinion 
of the city. The overall response clearly indicates that the rank and 
file strongly supports those union interventions that mediate their 
relations with the city. Apparently, the majority believe that their 
treatment as employees as well as their working conditions would be less 
than satisfactory if they were not represented by the union. The rank 
and file also appear to strongly support the grievance procedure and per¬ 
ceive that DPSU's steward system is effective in the work area. 
The second issue area to be considered in "What are the opinions 
of the rank and file regarding the city's labor relations machinery?" 
Three variables were used to discern the opinions of the respondents to 
the above issue: 
V4 DPSU had no problems in its day-to-day 
relationship with the city between 1970-1975. 
V19 DPSU had no problems in its day-to-day 
relationship with the city between 1975-1980. 
V7 DPSU makes reasonable demands on the city. 
Only 16 percent of the women agreed that settlements cause taxes 
to go up whereas 40 percent of the men agreed. Within the age grouping, 
66.1 percent of those 52-69 agreed while 24.2 percent of those 18-34 and 
30.3 percent of those 35-51 agreed. Similarly, 67.7 percent of those 
respondents who have been members of DPSU for 21-27 years indicated they 
-1 28- 
agreed with this proposition compared with 31.5 percent, 23.0 percent and 
36.4 percent of those who have been members for 1-6 years, 7-13 years and 
14-20 years, respectively. Among those with incomes of 21-25k, 50.0 per¬ 
cent agreed compared to 41.6 percent and 24.0 percent of those with 
incomes 10-15k and 16-20k, respectively. 
There was a higher incidence of uniformity in responses across 
each independent variable than found in the previous table. Except for 
one instance, Table 15 indicates there was little support for the pro¬ 
positions that DPSU had no problems in its day-to-day relationship with 
the city between 1970-1980. Of those over 52, 44.4 percent agreed there 
were no problems between 1975-1980 compared with 18.2 percent and 15.2 
percent of those between the ages 18-34 and 35-51, respectively. However, 
there was consistently high support for the assertion that DPSU was 
reasonable in its demands. 
As noted in the discussion of Table 14, women, Whites, those with 
incomes between 10-20k and those with the least union seniority were more 
supportive of the proposition that the city would treat them the same. 
Also, it was found that men (64.0 percent), Whites (70.9 percent), those 
18-51 (60.6 percent and 63.7 percent), those earning 16-25k (60.0 percent 
and 71.5 percent) and those DPSU members with at least 1-20 years (62.9 
percent, 61.5 percent and 72.8 percent) tended to agree more with the 
assertion that bargaining agreements improved working conditions. 
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TABLE 15 
Problems Problems DPSU 




II. Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Gender 
Women (25) 4.0% 12.0% 84.0% 56.0% 
Men (50) 8.0 24.0 74.0 64.0 
Ethnicity 
Black (19) 10.6 15.8 57.9 31.6 
White (55) 5.4 21.8 83.7 70.9 
Age 
18-34 (33) 3.0 18.2 7 8.7 60.6 
35-51 (33) 9.1 15.2 75.8 63.7 
52-69 ( 9) 11.1 44.4 77.8 55.6 
Salary 
10-15k (12) — — 50.0 58.3 
16-20k (50) 4.0 26.0 78.0 60.0 
21-2 5k (14) 21.4 14.2 100.0 71.5 
Length of DPSU 
Membership 
0- 6 (35) 5.8 11.5 77.1 62.9 
7-13 (26) 3.8 26.9 80.8 61.5 
14-20 (ID 18.2 27.9 81.8 72.8 
21-27 ( 3) — 33.3 66.7 33.3 
Summary 
The key findings here are the rank and file's opinion that DPSU 
had problems with the city during the period 1970-1980 even though it is 
strongly believed that DPSU makes reasonable demands. Add to this the 
previously stated finding that the majority strongly supports the inter¬ 
ventions that mediate their relations with the city, and there are 
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indications the rank and file feel less than positive about the way the 
city manages its labor relations programs. 
Table 16 addresses the rank and file's perception of taxpayer 
"willingness" to accept increases in taxes for improved working conditions 
and salary increases for employees represented by DPSU. Three variables 
were used to discern the opinions of respondents: 
V16 City taxpayers are in favor of better 
working conditions for DPSU members. 
Vll City taxpayers are in favor of more pay 
for DPSU members. 
V6 City taxpayers support union members' 
demands. 
V2 Union settlements cause taxes in the 
city to go up. 
According to Table 16, respondents were uniform in their percep¬ 
tions regarding whether taxpayers favor more pay for DPSU members. 
Women, Blacks, and those between 18-51 tended to agree less than men, 
Whites and those between 52-69. Those respondents making 10-15k and 
those having been DPSU members for over 14 years tended to be less sup¬ 
portive of the proposition. 
There was also minimal support for the proposition that taxpayers 
support union members' demands. This was particularly the case with 
respect to age, salary, and membership longevity. In terms of age, 30.3 
percent of those 18-34 and 33.3 percent of those over 52 agreed compared 
to 18.2 percent of those 35-51. In terms of salary levels, 7.1 percent 
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of those making 21-25k agreed compared to 33.0 percent and 28.0 percent 
of those earning 10-15k and 16-20k, respectively. Of those union members 
with 1-6 years, 31.4 percent tended to agree as did 26.9 percent of those 
with 7-13 years. Conversely, 9.1 percent of union members with 14-20 

















III. Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Gender 
Women (25) 16.0% 28.0% 12.0% 24.0% 
Men (50) 40.0 44.0 16.0 26.0 
Ethnicity 
Black (19) 36.9 52.6 10.5 26.4 
White (55) 40.9 34.6 16.3 23.6 
Age 
18-34 (33) 24.2 39.4 15.1 30.3 
35-51 (33) 30.3 36.3 12.1 18.2 
52-69 ( 9) 66.1 55.6 33.3 33.3 
Salary 
10-15k (12) 41.6 33.3 8.3 33.0 
16-20k (50) 24.0 34.0 28.0 28.0 
21-2 5k (14) 50.0 64.3 14.3 7.1 
Length of DPSU 
Membership 
0- 6 (35) 31.5 45.7 17.1 31.4 
7-13 (26) 23.0 30.7 23.0 26.9 
14-20 (11) 36.4 54.6 — 9.1 
21-27 ( 3) 67.7 — — — 
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Only 16 percent of the women agreed that settlements cause taxes 
to go up whereas 40 percent of the men agreed. Within the age grouping, 
66.1 percent of those 52-69 agreed while 24.2 percent of those 18-34 and 
30.3 percent of those 35-51 agreed. Similarly, 67.7 percent of those 
respondents who had been members of DPSU for 21-27 years indicated they 
agreed with this proposition compared with 31.5 percent, 23.0 percent and 
36.4 percent of those who have been members for 1-6 years, 7-13 years and 
14-20 years, respectively. Among those with incomes of 21-25k, 50.0 
percent agreed compared to 41.6 percent and 24.0 percent of those with 
incomes 10-15k and 16-20k, respectively. 
Opinions noticeably fluctuated about whether taxpayers favor 
better working conditions for DPSU members. Among women and men 18.0 
percent of the women agreed compared with 44.0 percent of the men. The 
breakdown along racial lines indicates 52.6 percent of Blacks agreed com¬ 
pared to 34.6 percent of Whites. Of those over 52, 55.6 percent agreed 
compared with 39.4 percent and 36.3 percent of those between 18-34 and 
35-51, respectively. Similarly, 64.3 percent of those earning salaries 
between 21-25k agreed compared with 33.3 percent of those earning 10-15k 
and 34.0 percent of those earning 16-20k. Finally, 45.7 percent and 30.7 
percent of those union members with 1-6 and 7-13 years, respectively, 
agreed compared to 54.6 percent of those who have been members for 14-20 




The key finding emerging from Table 16 is the rank and file's 
perception that taxpayers are not supportive of their demands for im¬ 
proved wages. And as the previous discussion of the contracts revealed, 
wage increases were the crux of most DPSU contract agreements. This, in 
turn probably accounts for the rank and file's negative response regard¬ 
ing whether taxpayers support DPSU demands. However, there is ambiva¬ 
lence about whether taxpayers would support DPSU demands related to 
improved working conditions. 
The fourth issue area considered was "What are the sentiments of 
DPSU rank and file toward striking against the city?" Three variables 
were used to elicit the attitudes of the respondents: 
VI The right to strike will benefit your union? 
V10 Members of the bargaining unit would partici¬ 
pate in a work stoppage over something other 
than wages. 
V21 Members of the bargaining unit would partici¬ 
pate in a work stoppage over something other 
than fringe benefits. 
Among women and men, there was comparable agreement regarding 
whether the right to strike would be beneficial. Blacks, on the other 
hand, were less supportive than Whites on the questions as 31.7 percent 
of Blacks agreed compared to 58.1 percent of Whites. Of those 18-34, 60.6 
percent agreed compared to 42.4 percent and 33.3 percent between the ages 
35-51 and 52-69, respectively. Similarly, 54.3 percent of those who had 
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been members for 1-6 years and 66.7 exceeding 21 years clearly supported 
this proposition whereas those having been members for 7-13 and 14-20 
years had comparable levels of agreement at 46.2 percent and 45.5 per¬ 
cent, respectively. 
TABLE 17 








IV. Agree Agree Agree 
Gender 
Women (25) 44.0% 40.0% 44.0% 
Men (50) 52.0 70.0 72.0 
Ethnicity 
Black (19) 31.7 42.1 42.1 
White (55) 58.1 67.2 69.1 
Age 
18-3 4 (33) 60.6 48.5 57.6 
35-51 (33) 42.4 63.6 72.7 
52-69 ( 9) 33.3 88.9 44.4 
Salary 
10-15k (12) 25.0 41.7 25.0 
16-20k (50) 50.0 58.0 70.0 
21-2 5k (14) 71.5 85.7 71.4 
Length of DPSU 
Membership 
0- 6 (35) 54.3 47.2 54.3 
7-13 (26) 46.2 53.9 65.4 
14-20 (11) 45.5 90.9 72.8 
21-27 ( 3) 66.7 66.7 100.0 
Variables 10 and 21 were designed to determine if union members be¬ 
lieved others in the bargaining unit would participate in a work stoppage 
over something other than wages. Regarding striking over non-wage issues, 
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women were less supportive than men. Among men, 70.0 percent agreed 
compared to 40.0 percent of the women. In response to striking over 
non-fringe benefit issues, women were again less supportive than men as 
72.0 percent of the latter agreed compared to 44.0 percent of the women. 
Among Blacks, 42.1 percent agreed that members of the bargaining 
unit would participate in a work stoppage over non-wage and non-fringe 
benefits issues compared to 67.2 percent and 69.1 percent of White 
respondents who indicated agreement. 
Within the age grouping, younger respondents were less supportive 
around the issue of striking over non-wage matters, while older respon¬ 
dents were less supportive of striking over non-fringe benefit issues. 
Regarding striking over non-wage issues, 48.5 percent of those respon¬ 
dents 18-34 agreed compared with 63.6 percent of those 35-51 and 88.9 
percent of those over 52. In response to striking over non-fringe bene¬ 
fit issues, 44.4 percent of those over 52 agreed whereas 57.6 percent of 
those 18-34 and 72.7 percent of those 35-51 agreed. 
Income levels and membership longevity also produced disparate 
responses. With respect to striking over non-wage concerns, 41.7 percent 
of those with salary levels of 10-15k agreed compared with 48.0 percent 
and 85.7 percent of those with salary levels of 16-20k and 21-25k, 
respectively. Of those with minimal seniority, 47.2 percent agreed com¬ 
pared to 53.9 percent, 90.9 percent and 66.7 percent of those with 713 
years, 14-20 years and those having over 21 years, respectively. 
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Striking over non-fringe benefit issues resulted in 25.0 percent 
of those at salary levels between 10-15k agreeing compared to 70.0 per¬ 
cent and 71.4 percent of those earning 16-20k and over 21k, respectively. 
Among union members with over 21 years, 100 percent agreed such strikes 
were possible compared with 54.3 percent of those with the least seniority 
(1-6 years) and 65.4 percent and 72.8 percent of those having been members 
for 7-13 and 14-20 years, respectively. 
Summary 
Based on findings emerging from Table 17 there is uniformly high 
support for striking against the city particularly among those earning 
16-25k. That there is a high degree of potential militancy among the 
rank and file is a crucial finding in that the recently implemented com¬ 
prehensive public labor relations law legitimizes public employee 
strikes. Moreover, with the high belief that working conditions are 
improved through negotiations and that other members of the bargaining 
unit will strike over non-wage issues, the rank and file appear to be 
willing to strike over a broad range of concerns beyond those of "wage or 
salary" demands. 
The fifth issue area considered the question of labor unity by 
asking "What is the level of support for labor unity among DPSU members?" 
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Four variables were used to elicit responses: 
V15 The other unions in the city government make 
reasonable demands on the city. 
V17 Other unions ask for too much from the city. 
V22 Demands made by other unions on the city have 
caused grievances presented by DPSU to receive 
less consideration. 
V12 DPSU should support other union demands on the 
city. 
Table 18 produced the following observations. Among women and 
men, 40 percent of women agreed compared to 56 percent of the men that 
other unions make reasonable demands. There was a similar difference 
between Blacks and Whites. Among Blacks, 42.1 percent agreed compared 
with 52.8 percent of the White respondents. Within each age group, there 
was minimal difference as 48.4 percent of those 18-34 agreed compared to 
54.6 percent and 55.5 percent of those 35-51 and those over 51, respec¬ 
tively. Of those respondents who had been members of DPSU for 7-20 years, 
65.4 percent (7-13 years) and 54.6 percent (14-20 years) agreed compared 
to 42.9 percent of those with less than 6 years and 33.3 percent of those 
with more than 21 years. 
Among those with incomes of 10-15k, 16.6 percent agreed compared 
to 52.0 percent and 78.5 percent of those earning 16-20k and 21-25k, 
respectively, that other unions made reasonable demands. 
Similar consistency in responses was found regarding whether DPSU 
should support other union demands on the city. For example, there is 
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only two (2) percentage points difference between women and men, and 7.4 
percentage points difference between Black and White respondents. Within 
each age group, the percentage point difference between those 18-51 and 
















Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Women (25) 40.0% 24.0% 3 6.0% 56.0% 
Men (50) 56.0 20.0 32.0 48.0 
Ethnicity 
Black (19) 42.1 26.3 21.1 52.6 
White (55) 52.8 20.0 38.2 60.0 
Age 
18-34 (33) 48.4 12.1 27.3 57.6 
35-51 (33) 54.6 21.2 39.4 56.6 
52-69 ( 9) 55.5 55.5 44.4 55.5 
Salary 
10-15k (12) 16.6 33.4 25.0 41.7 
16-20k (50) 52.0 20.0 32.0 58.0 
21-2 5k (14) 78.5 14.0 50.0 71.4 
Length of DPSU 
Membership 
0- 6 (35) 42.9 14.3 25.7 57.1 
7-13 (26) 65.4 23.0 50.0 73.1 
14-20 (ID 54.6 27.3 17.3 36.4 
21-27 ( 3) 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
There is more variance when the responses are viewed from the 
perspective of salary and membership longevity. For example, of those 
members with 7-13 years, 73.1 percent agreed while 57.1 percent of those 
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having less than 6 years agreed. Conversely, of those having more 
seniority, 36.4 percent of those with 14-20 years and 33.3 percent of 
those with over 21 years agreed with the proposition. 
Variables 17 and 22 were negatively phrased regarding other 
unions and the relatively low agreements supports the contention that 
DPSU members tend to be supportive of labor unity. However, there were 
several instances of difference. 
Regarding the proposition that "Other unions ask for too much 
from the city,” 26.3 percent of the Black respondents indicated agreement 
compared to 20.0 percent of the Whites. Within each age group, 55.5 per¬ 
cent of those over 52 agreed compared with 12.2 percent of those 18-34 
and 21.1 percent of those 35-51. In terms of salary levels, only 14.0 
percent of those earning 21-25k agreed while 33.4 percent and 20.0 per¬ 
cent of those earning 10-15k and 16-20k, respectively, agreed. In terms 
of DPSU membership, of those with the least seniority 14.3 percent agreed 
compared with 23.0 percent, 27.3 percent and 33.3 percent of member with 
7-13, 14-20 and 21-27 years, respectively. 
Regarding the proposition that grievances presented by DPSU are 
affected by demands made by other unions, 38.2 percent of Whites agreed 
compared with 21.1 percent of Black respondents. Within the age grouping, 
44.4 percent of 52-69 and 39.4 percent of those 35-51 agreed. In terms 
of salary levels, 50.0 percent of those earning over 21k agreed compared 
with 25.0 percent of those earning 10-15k and 32.0 percent of those earn- 
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ing 16-20k. Similarly, 50.0 percent of those union members with 7-13 
years agreed compared to 25.7 percent, 27.3 percent and 33.3 percent of 
those with the least seniority, 1-6, 14-20 and 21-27 years, respectively. 
Based upon Table 18, the level of support for labor unity is high 
among DPSU members. Across each independent variable there was generally 
high agreement for the positively phrased dependent variables regarding 
other unions and generally low agreement for the negatively phrased 
dependent variables regarding other unions. When this support for labor 
unity is juxtaposed with the rank and file's militancy, DPSU could become 
a factor in the strategy and tactics employed by the public safety 
employees' union in their relationship with the city. 
The sixth issue area considered the questions "At what level were 
most grievances settled?" Three variables were used to discern the 
opinions of the respondents: 
V3 I filed a grievance that was settled between 
the steward and supervisor. 
V13 I filed a grievance that was settled between 
the steward and my department head. 
V20 I filed a grievance that was settled between 
the union president and personnel director. 
Of the eight issues considered, this question produced not only 
the least, but the most mixed responses. For example, women tended to 
agree less than men regarding the level of grievance settlements. There 
was a 22 percentage point, 10 percentage point, and 14 percentage point 
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difference between women and men for each dependent variable. Among 
Black and White respondents, there were identical responses regarding 
grievance settlements involving the steward and supervisor and steward 
and department head. However, both Black and White respondents tended to 
indicate minimal agreement regarding the involvement of the union presi¬ 
dent and personnel director as 16.3 percent of Whites agreed while Blacks 
indicated no agreement at all. 
TABLE 19 







VI. Agree Agree Agree 
Gender 
Women (25) 16.0% 2 4.0% 4.0% 
Men (50) 38.0 34.0 18.0 
Ethnicity 
Black (19) 31.6 31.6 — 
White (55) 27.3 27.2 16.3 
Age 
18-3 4 (33) 27.3 24.3 12.2 
35-51 (33) 30.3 39.4 15.2 
52-69 ( 9) 44.4 22.2 11.1 
Salary 
10-15k (12) 33.3 16.7 — 
16-20k (50) 28.0 30.0 8.0 
21-2 5k (14) 35.7 42.8 42.9 
Length of DPSU 
Membership 
0- 6 (35) 20.0 22.9 5.8 
7-13 (26) 38.5 38.4 11.5 
14-20 (11) 27.3 18.2 36.4 
21-27 ( 3) 100.0 100.0 33.3 
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Within the age groupings, 30.3 percent and 44.4 percent of those 35-51 
and 52-69, respectively, agreed regarding grievance settlements between 
the steward and supervisor. In response to steward/department head 
grievance settlement, 39.4 percent of those 35-51 and 22.2 percent of 
those over 52 agreed. Regarding grievance settlements involving the 
union president and personnel director, 15.2 percent of those 35-51 
agreed compared to 12.2 perent under 34 and 11.1 percent of those over 
52. 
Turning to salary levels and membership longevity, the mixed 
responses continue. For example, 100 percent of those with over 21 years 
of union membership agreed that grievance settlements tend to take place 
between the steward and supervisor compared to 20 percent of those with 
the least union seniority (1-6 years), 27.3 percent of those having 14-20 
years and 38.5 percent of those having been members 7-13 years* 
In response to grievance settlement between the steward and 
department head, only 16.7 percent of those earning 10-15k agreed while 
30.0 percent and 42.8 percent of those earning 16-20k and 21-25k, 
respectively, agreed. Of those having over 21 years union membership, 
100 percent agreed compared to 18.2 percent, 38.4 percent and 22.9 per¬ 
cent of those having been union members for 14-20 years, 7-13 years, and 
1-6 years, respectively. 
In response to grievance settlement between the union president 
and personnel director, 42.9 percent of those earning 21-25k agreed com- 
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pared to 8.0 percent of those earning 16-2Ok and no agreement from those 
earning 10-15k. Of those DPSU members with the least seniority, only 5.8 
percent (1-6 years) and 11.5 percent (7-13 years) agreed compared to 36.4 
percent and 33.3 percent of those having been union members 14-20 years 
and those having over 21 years, respectively. 
The findings emerging from Table 19 reinforce one of the most 
significant findings on the issue of union representation. The rank and 
file believe that most complaints causing grievance are resolved by DPSU 
stewards without leaving the immediate work area or department. Add to 
this the preception that steward are concerned about how supervisors 
assign work (and probably carry out other responsibilities as well) it 
is clear that the rank and file are very supportive of DPSU's steward 
system. 
The seventh issue area was concerned with the question "What are 
the opinions of the rank and file regarding issues likely to cause 
grievances?" Eight variables were used to discern the opinions and per¬ 
ceptions of the respondents: 
V23 Salary dispute V27 Discipline 
V24 Work rules V28 Overtime 
V25 Seniority V29 Classification procedures 
V26 Assignment of work V30 Fringe benefit rules 
As Table 20 indicates, across each independent variable there was 
consistent agreement that all the issues cited would cause grievances. 
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The variables generating the highest level of response across the major¬ 
ity of the independent variables were salary disputes, work rules, 
discipline, overtime and classification procedures. The remaining vari¬ 
ables, fringe benefit rules, assignment of work and seniority generated 








VII. Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Gender 
Women (25) 44.0% 60.0% 48.0% 48.0% 
Men (50) 68.0 78.0 72.0 62.0 
Ethnicity 
Black (19) 57.9 63.2 47.3 31.6 
White (55) 60.0 72.7 70.9 63.6 
Age 
18-3 4 (33) 45.4 54.5 57.6 48.5 
35-51 (33) 60.1 81.9 66.6 60.7 
52-69 ( 9) 100.0 88.9 66.7 66.7 
Salary 
10-15k (12) 50.0 66.6 41.7 41.6 
16-20k (50) 62.0 68.0 64.0 54.0 
21-2 5k (14) 57.1 85.7 78.5 78.6 
Length of DPSU 
Membership 
0- 6 (35) 60.0 45.7 57.1 48.5 
7-13 (26) 53.9 65.4 61.6 57.7 
14-20 (11) 63.6 100.0 79.8 90.9 
21-27 ( 3) 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3 
For example, regarding salary disputes, 44.0 percent of women 
respondents agreed compared to 68.0 percent of the men. Within the age 
groupings, 45.4 percent of those 18-34 agreed while 60.1 percent and 100 
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percent of those 35-51 and those over 52 years, respectively, indicated 
agreement. In terms of membership longevity, 100 percent of those over 
21 years agreed compared to 60.0 percent, 53.9 percent and 63.6 percent 
of those having been members 1-20 years. 
Regarding work rules, the most noticeable variance was within the 
age group and union longevity. Of those with the least seniority (1-6 
years), 45.7 percent agreed compared to 65.4 percent of those having been 
members 7-13 years and 100 percent of those having been members for over 
14 years. Within the age grouping, 54.5 percent of those 18-34 agreed 
compared with 81.9 percent and 88.9 percent of those 35-51 and those over 
52, respectively. 
With regard to overtime, 42.1 percent of the Black respondents 
agreed compared to 63.6 percent of Whites. In terms of salary levels, 
85.7 percent of those earning over 21k agreed while 50.0 percent and 52.0 
percent of those earning 10-15k and 16-20k, respectively, agreed. Of 
those with the least seniority (1-6 years), 45.7 percent agreed compared 
to 61.5 percent, 90.9 percent and 66.7 percent of those union members with 
7-13 years, 14-20 years, and over 21 years, respectively. 
Classification procedures generated variance primarily in the 
variables related to salary levels and union longevity. Of those earning 
16-20k, 46.0 percent agreed while 50.0 percent and 64.3 percent of those 
earning 10-15k and 21-25k, respectively, agreed. In terms of union 
membership, 90.9 percent of those with 14-20 years agreed compared to 
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60.0 percent, 57.7 percent, and 66.7 percent of those having been members 
for 1-6 years, 7-13 years, and 21-27 years. 
TABLE 20 
(Continued) 
Discipline Overtime Classification Fringes 
VII. Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Gender 
Women (25) 60.0% 52.0% 56.0% 40.0% 
Men (50) 70.0 62.0 68.0 50.0 
Ethnicity 
Black (19) 52.6 42.1 52.7 42.1 
White (55) 71.0 63.6 65.5 49.9 
Age 
18-34 (33) 57.6 51.5 57.6 45.4 
35-51 (33) 72.7 63.7 63.6 36.4 
52-69 ( 9) 66.6 55.6 77.8 77.8 
Salary 
10-15k (12) 58.3 50.0 50.0 41.6 
16-20k (50) 64.0 52.0 46.0 48.0 
21-2 5k (14) 7 8.6 85.7 64.3 42.4 
Length of DPSU 
Membership 
0- 6 (35) 60.0 45.7 60.0 48.6 
7-13 (26) 65.4 61.5 57.7 38.5 
14-20 (ID 90.9 90.9 90.9 63.6 
21-27 ( 3) 66.7 66.7 66.7 33.3 
Of the remaining variables, fringe benefit rules produced notice¬ 
able variance across the independent variables of gender, age and union 
membership. For example, 63.6 percent of those having been union members 
14-20 years agreed compared to 48.6 percent, 38.5 percent and 33.3 percent 
of those with union memberships for 1-6 years, 7-13 years and over 21 
years, respectively. In terms of age, 77.8 percent over 52 agreed 
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compared to 45.4 percent of those 18-34 and 36.4 percent of those 35-51. 
Among women, 40 percent agreed compared to 50 percent of the men. 
With respect to assignment of work, women tended to be less sup¬ 
portive than men as 48.0 percent of women agreed while 62.0 percent of 
the men indicated agreement. There was a 30 percentage point difference 
along ethnic/racial lines as 31.6 percent of Blacks agreed compared to 
63.6 percent of Whites. In terms of age, younger respondents tended to 
be less supportive as 48.5 percent agreed compared to 60.7 percent of 
those 35-51 and 66.7 percent of those over 52. Of those on the lower 
salary level (10-15k) 41.6 percent agreed while 54.0 percent and 78.6 
percent of those earning 16-20k and over 21k, respectively, agreed. With 
respect to membership longevity, 90.9 percent of those with 14-20 years 
agreed compared to 48.5 percent, 57.7 percent and 33.3 percent of those 
with 1-6 years, 7-13 years, and those with over 21 years, respectively. 
Regarding the issue of seniority, women tended to be less suppor¬ 
tive as 48.0 percent agreed compared to 72.0 percent of the men. There 
was a 23.7 percentage point difference along ethnic/racial lines as only 
47.3 percent of Blacks agreed compared to 70.9 percent of White respon¬ 
dents. Lower salaried respondents tended to be less supportive as only 
41.7 percent agreed while 64.0 percent of those earning 16-20k and 78.5 
percent of those earning over 21k agreed. With respect to membership 
longevity, 100 percent of those with over 21 years agreed compared to 
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57.1 percent of those with the least seniority (1-6 years), 61.6 percent 
of those with 7-13 years and 79.8 percent of those with 14-20 years. 
Summary 
The findings emerging from Table 20 have several implications. 
It appears the rank and file feel very strongly about issues that consti¬ 
tute the core of the employment relationship. Secondly, the high level 
of agreement that the cited issues could cause grievances indicates a 
willingness on the part of the rank and file to challenge management 
decisions in these areas. This affirms the previously noted "militancy" 
of the respondents. Thirdly, since these are key employment issues, it 
is conceiveable that such concerns could become part of the scope of 
bargaining and eventually issues over which the rank and file might 
strike. And as Table 17 revealed, the respondents appeared more than 




This study examined Dayton's labor relations policy with parti¬ 
cular attention to the formal bargaining outcomes contained in the 1969- 
1981 contracts negotiated between DPSU and Dayton city management. 
Complementing this content analysis was a survey analysis of the general 
service employees represented by DPSU Local 101. The reasons for docu¬ 
menting the Dayton bargaining experience stemmed from several factors. 
First there is a dearth of knowledge of public labor policy 
established in medium-sized and small political jurisdictions because of 
the concentration of research efforts in this area on large cities. The 
author agrees with the explanation and conclusions advanced by Korn per¬ 
taining to this emphasis in the research: 
[It] might be that more complete data are available 
for large cities than for smaller ones. Another 
reason might be that large cities by virtue of the 
greater complexity of their labor relations system, 
are viewed in more interesting units of analysis 
than smaller cities. A final reason might be that 
labor relations developments in some of the nation's 
largest cities are viewed as harbingers of develop¬ 
ments in the smaller cities, and therefore, research 
emphasis should be placed on the trendsetters. 
Regardless of the reasons for the emphasis on large 
cities, however...labor relations experiences in 
smaller cities do not necessarily mirror those 
of the larger ones. ° 
^Korn, p. 10. 
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Similar ly , little is known about the bargaining experiences of 
jurisdictions where no comprehensive state labor law exists. And, it 
appears that the prevailing notions regarding the impact of bargaining 
outcomes have not been based on studies of non-uniform and non- 
educational employees. Therefore, to expand the knowledge of public 
sector collective bargaining under the preceding circumstances, the 
present study was undertaken. 
It was pointed out in the introduction and throughout the study, 
that various propositions regarding the outcomes of public sector collec¬ 
tive bargaining have emerged from previous research projects. This study 
was designed to examine some of these propositions and the author be¬ 
lieves the findings have made a modest contribution toward showing either 
support or lack of support for findings of prior research efforts. 
However, it is important to note the limitations of the present 
study. First, the contract agreements are the primary data base used to 
document the outcomes resulting from bargaining for the entire period 
under study. Consequently, an evaluation of the more dynamic aspects 
underlaying the parties' bargaining relationship is not included in the 
analysis. 
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In large measure, certain dimensions of the parties' relationship 
could not be addressed because of the difficulty of obtaining information 
from the parties. For example, DPSU would not allow the researcher 
access to the union's institutional memory regarding bargaining history 
and both parties discouraged inquiry about the outcomes of the grievance 
and arbitration procedure. 
Given that the literature reflects a dearth of data on these 
subjects, this researcher's experience may not be typical. An alterna¬ 
tive method that could alleviate this obstacle would be an on-going 
involvement by the researcher over an extended period of time with at 
least one of the parties. 
The second limitation concerns the survey analysis of the rank- 
and-file. It is difficult to offer generalizations about how the rank- 
and-file perceives the outcomes of the labor relations policy and 
practices because the level of response to the survey did not produce the 
representative sample needed for a "robust analysis.” Thus, the findings 
are posited as tentative indicators of the rank-and-file's opinions and 
attitudes. 
Despite these observations, the investigation does contribute to 
the knowledge of public sector collective bargaining particularly with 
respect to jurisdictions where no statute exists. For example, it was 
noted that one impact of the institutionalization of collective bargaining 
is the implementation of structural and legal changes in governmental 
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arrangements. Dayton's governmental structure underwent some modifica¬ 
tion in response to collective bargaining. The 1972 labor ordinance 
which was passed vested responsibility for bargaining in the city manager 
who in turn delegates the responsibility for negotiations and contract 
administration to the Labor Relations Division of the Personnel Depart¬ 
ment. Thus, the city did not create a separate, "neutral" public labor 
relations agency or board to administer the labor policy found in several 
other local jurisdictions. For conflict resolution, the parties utilize 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services for factfinding and/or 
advisory arbitration during negotiations and binding arbitration in 
contract disputes.^ 
The bargaining agreements did not address the nature of the ser¬ 
vices performed by the bargaining unit. For example, the contracts made 
no mention of manning schedules or how job assignments were to be 
handled. In fact, the sole item remotely related to service provision, 
subcontracting, is basically a "meet and confer" provision requiring 
only that prior to taking such action management should discuss the 
effects upon the bargaining unit. 
In terms of personnel administration, civil service rules and regu¬ 
lations are challengeable through the grievance procedure, but there is no 
effort to interject the principle of seniority in the areas of selection 
or promotion that are incompatible with extant merit policies or proce¬ 
dures. And while the contracts address personnel policies and procedures 
^The neutrality of such a board could be achieved by having a 
representative of management and labor and a neutral whose full-time 
employment and authority would be derived from a local labor ordinance. 
-1 53- 
wit h in the purview of the civil service board, there has been no diminu¬ 
tion in the scope of the boards responsibility and authority, or in merit 
system principles. 
It was also found that passage of the enabling ordinance that 
legitimized collective bargaining followed the pattern advanced by Feller 
and Stone. There was no solicitation of input from the city's unions or 
public debate in the media or records of any pre-legislative discussion 
before the city council regarding what items should be incorporated into 
the bargaining ordinance. Consequently, the public policy formalizing 
the bargaining relationship (with few modifications) was imposed upon all 
the city unions belieing any notion that the institutionalization process 
had been a bilateral or multilateral one. 
The investigation also revealed that the enabling ordinance 
omitted certain aspects of bargaining legislation found in other politi¬ 
cal jurisdictions such as an independent adjudicative labor relations 
board (analogous to the civil service board) and specified prohibitions 
related to the duty to bargain and unilateral decisionmaking (unfair 
labor practices). 
Moreover, it appears that in political jurisdictions like Dayton, 
where home rule status has been used to legitimize the bargaining process 
because of the absence of a statutory obligation, unions are obliged to 
negotiate agreements where political and judicial conditions implicitly 
ignore challenges to public management authority. Since employees cannot 
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strike to contest any management action, third party neutrals called upon 
to resolve negotiation impasses have to take cognizance of the "voluntary" 
nature of Dayton's labor policy as it regards management's obligations to 
collectively bargain. 
In the Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Dayton and City of 
Dayton and AFSCME Local //101,^8 it was ruled that absent a state law 
providing for collective bargaining, the power to collectively bargain 
and to place limitations on the labor process inheres in the exercise of 
self-government. And in this regard, it was explicitly stated by the 
Court in FOP etal that the city would establish conditions under which it 
would collectively bargain and the bargaining representative had to ac¬ 
cept these conditions or have no agreement. Moreover, the city manager, 
who is responsible for promulgating the rules framework that, in effect, 
defines the bargaining process needs only to Insure the following: 
...[R]ules [are] validly adopted...administrative 
and [do] not change, add to, or subtract from the 
substance of the ordinance or deny any organization 
any right granted by federal or state law or local 
ordinance or chapter.^ 
If these minimal legal requirements are fulfilled and the union 
duly notified, nothing precludes management from effecting rule changes 
or implementing new bargaining policies. Thus, case law, which suggests 
on one hand, that management has a minimum obligation to abide by its own 
promulgated laws, also supplies the legal foundation to defuse any 
unacceptable union militancy by not only upholding management's right to 
^Government Employee Relations Report (August 28, 1978): 774:15 
and Government Employee Relations Report (October 1, 1979): 830:10-13, 
Bureau of National Affairs. 
99 GERR 830:12. 
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unilaterally alter or modify extant bargaining rules, but to also refuse 
to discuss any issue viewed outside the "pale" of legitimate union 
concern. In other words, Dayton's labor policy did not feature the 
structural guarantees within the bargaining process which could mediate 
the "chilling legal" bias toward management control of the process. 
This third party support of Dayton management's ultimate control 
of the bargaining process exemplifies the argument advanced in Chapter I 
that notwithstanding the elaboration and implementation of the bargaining 
process, "Law and practice denotes unmistakable power disparities between 
management and workers." It also illustrates Edwards' observation 
regarding the ambivalent nature of bargaining in the public sector: 
In practice, most [political jurisdictions] have 
adopted either a modified meet-and-confer statute 
...or a modified collective negotiations statute 
which is more restrictive from the union's view¬ 
point than its private sector counterpart. For 
this reason alone, it is often difficult to dis¬ 
tinguish between the meet-and-confer and collective 
negotiations concepts in the public sector. 
It further suggests that formalization of bargaining has minimal impact 
upon the structure or operation of the administrative apparatus when the 
scope of bargaining can be limited to reiterations of extant administra¬ 
tive policy. 
For example, one insight garnered from an examination of the con¬ 
tract agreements is the extent to which issues comprising the agreements 
are not products of joint rulemaking or bilateral decisions by "equals" 
that presumably inhere in collective bargaining. Rather, a significant 
lO^Harry T. Edwards, "The Impact of Private Sector Principles 
in the Public Sector: The Duty to Bargain," in Public Sector Labor 
Relations, p. 185. 
l^lpaul F. Gerhart, "The Scope of Bargaining in Local 
Government Labor Negotiations," Labor Law Journal 20 (August 1969): 
128, 133. 
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number of non-wage outcomes are basically recapitulations of extant 
policies. 
The study also raises some question about the widespread assump¬ 
tion regarding the nexus of public policy and collective bargaining 
outcomes. As the DPSU contracts demonstrate, the work rules subject to 
negotiation emanate from public statutes or local ordinances, yet, the 
outcomes do not address substantive issues related to either the purpose 
and/or intent of public policy. Thus the general conclusion that bar¬ 
gaining within a governmental context translates to literal discussion of 
public policy appears to be somewhat overstated. 
In the author's view, juxtaposing a local enabling ordinance 
devoid of a statutory requirement to negotiate to a scope of bargaining 
that is implicitly circumscribed by a "chilling" legal stance tends to 
vitiate non-wage outcomes leaving wages the only jointly determined mat¬ 
ter between DPSU and the city. Since the bargaining outcomes are limited 
to the latter concern, a question arises about how the rank and file per¬ 
ceives the outcomes of labor relations policy and practices. 
According to the tentative indicators, DPSU is strongly supported 
by the rank and file for several reasons. The rank and file believes 
union intervention contributes to their positive treatment as employees 
and improved working conditions. A key factor in this assessment is the 
apparent efficacy of the union's steward system in the work area. Based 
on the indicators, the nature of the relationship between the union and 
-157- 
city management deteriorated during the period under study as evidenced 
by negative comments about the day-to-day relationship and the perception 
that DPSU was reasonable and therefore did not provoke the problems- 
Should this attitude persist under the newly established statewide 
labor policy, the data indicates the rank and file are potentially very 
militant and willing to strike over a broad range of concerns. For 
example, the rank and file feel very strongly about issues at the core of 
the employer-employee relationship and indicated a willingness to 
challenge management decisions in these areas through the grievance pro¬ 
cedure. More importantly, since some of these employment issues are 
likely topics for negotiations, the respondents' acknowledgement that 
they were willing to participate in a strike over non-wage and non-fringe 
benefits potentially has important implications for the nature of future 
city-union relationships. 
The rank and file's potential militancy is also significant in 
relation to the issue of labor unity. Given the high visibility of 
public employees in law enforcement and fire fighting at the municipal 
level, general service employees and their unions are susceptible to 
being ignored by city management because they pose of less a threat 
politically than the former. However, the rank and file did not evince 
any feelings of resentment or inferiority that could be exploited by 
management through divide and conquer tactics. Secondly, since the new 
labor policy prohibits public safety employees from striking, DPSU's 
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willingness to support other union demands could translate into demon¬ 
strations of "solidarity" including a strike. 
Finally, it is instructive to note that the rank and file’s 
militancy appears to be informed by the perception that there is minimal 
support from the city's taxpayers for union demands generally and 
increased wages specifically. This may also account for the positive 
attitude toward labor unity among the rank and file. 
As pointed out in the Introduction, although there are alternate 
claims regarding the outcome of labor reform within the bureaucracy, the 
prevailing view which pervades the literature and research in this area, 
camouflages a managerial bias implicit in the assumption that bargaining 
will have deleterious effect for government operations. The present case 
study utilized an institutionalist approach to describe and study one 
city's public labor policy and the resultant outcomes. However, the 
latter research and analysis was informed by a critical theoretical 
analysis which posited that bargaining reform incorporated a managerial 
bias that stifled any transcendence of the customary focus on wage and 
benefit bargaining. 
Thus, the overall assessment that Dayton's labor policy and out¬ 
comes effected minimal alteration in the political and governmental 
authority relations as viewed from this perspective. In other words, 
when the rhetoric of "representative democracy" is removed from the 
rationale of containment theorists, the introduction of labor reform 
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in the public sector is shaped and guided by management's determination 
to retain control of the employment relationship. 
On the other hand, the Dayton case gives little support to the 
contentions advanced by Johnston and others that substantive issues of 
public policy can emerge from negotiations related to "working 
conditions." Although the survey analysis suggested that the rank-and- 
file is potentially militant, it appears that this term will remain 
narrowly construed to limit discussion to internal workplace matters 
having no relation to the delivery of services, etc. 
Since the foregoing results emerged within the context of a case 
study, additional research along these lines is necessary. Among the 
questions that warrant further study are: 
To what extent do agreements consummated in other political 
jurisdictions reflect the tendency toward recapitulating extant adminis¬ 
trative policy? 
Is this tendency more likely to occur in political jurisdictions 
where there is no separate organization (either at the state or local 
level) administering the labor relations policy? 
In those political jurisdictions espousing a "progressive" and/or 
"socialist" posture, would the nature of the relationship between the 
city and union rank-and-file differ? 
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Would public managers with professed "radical perspectives" 
facilitate the development of a political environment that de-emphasized 
the managerial ideology of "control? "1-02 
Would rank-and-file militancy foster the expansion of the scope 
of bargaining with resultant negotiated outcomes of substantive workplace 
issues? 
Should the latter research produce affirmative results, it would go far 
toward removing the reified character of collective bargaining that seems 
to have fostered less a reform than a rearrangement of the public employ¬ 
ment relationship. 
California the municipalities of Berkeley, Santa Monica, 






Recreation Facility Attendant I 
Recreation Leader I 
Mail Clerk I 






Mail Clerk II 
Recreation Facility Attendant II 
GRADE 111 
Building Attendant I 
GRADE 112 
Automotive Servicer I 
Jail Attendant 
Laborer 
Security Worker I 
Stores Clerk I 
GRADE 113 
Building Attendant II 
Call Evaluator 
Engineering Aide I 
Exhibition Center Facilities 
Worker I 
Recreation Leader II 
Secruity Worker A 
Security Worker II 




Air Hammer Operator 
Automotive Parts Clerk I 
Automotive Servicer II 
Cook 
Duplicating Equipment Operator I 
GRADE 
Bridge Maintenance Worker I 




Kiln Operator I 
Pipeworker I 
Rehabilitation Specialist I 
GRADE 
Automotive Part Clerk II 
Equipment Operator II 
Golf Maintenance Worker 
Plant Nursery Attendant 
Park Floral Worker 
Park Service Worker 
Sewage Treatment Equipment Operator 
GRADE 
Building Maintenance Technician 
Building Trades Worker 
Engineering Aide II 
Exhibition Center Facilities Worker I 
Exhibition Center Maintenance Worker 
Farmer 
F lusher Operator 
Food Processor 
Golf Maintenance Crew Leader 
Kiln Operator II 
114 
Meter Reader I 
Property Clerk I 
Pumping Station Operator Helper 
Sewer Repairer I 
Well Field Operator 
115 
Sewer Service Worker I 
Traffic Control Mechanic I 
Traffic Signal Repairer 
Water Laborator Aide 
Water Meter Installer I 
Water Meter Repairer (Small) 
Water Service Representative I 
Water Treatment Plant Operator I 
Security Worker III 
116 
Stores Clerk II 
Traffic Control Mechanic I 
Tree Servicer I 
Waste Collection Driver 
Water Meter Installer II 
Water Meter Repairer (Large) 
Well Field Maintenance Worker 
Well Field Servicer 
117 
Park Maintenance Crew Leader 
Rehabilitation Specialist II 
Sewage Treatment Plant Operator I 
Sewer Cleaner Crew Leader 
Sewer Repairer II 
Traffic Controller Repairer 
Tree Servicer II 
Water Distribution Investigator 
Water Service Representative II 
Water System Crew Leader 
Water Treatment Plant Operator II 
-164- 
GRADE 118 
Airport Building Maintenance Worker A 
Airport Security Officer 
Automotive Mechanic 
Bridge Maintenance Worker II 
Drafter II 
Equipment Operator III 
Maintenance Mechanic I 
Meter Shop Crew Leader 
Pipeworker II 
Stores Clerk III 
Sweeper Operator 
Traffic Analyst 
Traffic Control Painter I 
Water Meter Installer III 
GRADE 
Carpenter 




Power Shovel Operator 
GRADE 
Airport Building Maintenance Worker 
Construction Inspector II 
Heavy Equipment Mechanic 
Maintenance Mechanic II 
119 
Sewage Treatment Plant Operator II 
Sewer Service Worker II 
Special Equipment Mechanic 
Tree Service Supervisor 




Radio Operator Repairer 
Rehabilitation Center Maintenance 
Wo rke r 
Traffic Control Painter II 
GRADE 228 
Home Improvement Advisor (Finance Specialist) 
Home Improvement Advisor (Rehabilitation Specialist) 
Housing Inspector 
GRADE 2 29 
Zoning Inspector 
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